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**Advantage 1 is Innovation —**

**Standards-Setting Organizations** [SSO’s] **are industry members who jointly establish standards for information tech defined by the adoption of standard-essential patents** [SEP’s]**, which are licensed to companies who wish to implement the tech in their product, called implementers, on Fair, Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory** [FRAND] **terms. Current standards promote price gouging, FRAND enforcement is critical.**

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I. Standard Setting and the Competitive Process

The **fundamental economics** in the **information technology** sector, driven by **network effects**, implies that there is **enormous value** associated with establishing compatibility standards. Popular standards include the mobile broadband standards used in cell phones, which are established by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), and the Wi-Fi technology for wireless local area networks, which is enabled by the 802.11 standard established by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE).4

There are many SSOs, and their rules and procedures differ considerably. In addition to IEEE, leading SSOs include the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), and the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C).5 SSOs generally establish standards by holding a series of committee meetings among industry participants. These meetings culminate in a vote on a technical specification that describes what features or attributes a product must have in order to comply with the standard. Most SSOs are open to all industry participants and seek to operate on a consensus basis, applying certain voting rules. SSOs do not normally engage in patent licensing, nor do they specify how patent royalties will be divided up among patent holders. They leave that to their members, which in some cases form patent pools to address these issues.6

SSOs adopt specific policies relating to intellectual property rights (IPRs).7 These IPR policies are generally intended to enable the SEP holders to obtain reasonable royalties for licensing their patents, while prohibiting them from charging excessive royalties after other industry participants have committed to the standard. At that point, firms committed to implementing the standard— which we call “implementers”—would find it **very costly** to avoid using the patented technology. For this purpose, most SSOs require SEP owners to license their SEPs on FRAND terms.8

FRAND policies are especially necessary because negotiations between SEP holders and implementers generally **take place only after** the implementers have used and infringed the technologies claimed by the SEPs. Standards involving information and communications technology can involve hundreds or even **thousands of SEPs**, many with **uncertain boundaries** for infringement. In addition, a time lag exists between patent application and patent issuance. For these and other reasons, it is **impractical** for implementers to enter into negotiations for patent licenses with all SEP owners prior to the establishment of a standard and to their implementation of it.9

The fact that patent negotiations generally do not take place until after implementers have used and infringed the technologies has several critical implications. First, at the time of negotiation, implementers are **locked into the standard** and the technologies claimed by the SEPs—that is, the **cost to switch** to an alternative technology or standard at that point—ex post—is **much greater** than it was ex ante, before the patented technology was first included in the standard. Ex post, the patent holder is no longer competing to have its technology included in the standard, nor is it competing to have implementers of the standard use its technology. Instead, because the patent holder owns an asset that is essential to the standard, implementers have no choice but to use the patented technology.

If the standard is commercially successful, implementers are willing to pay a much larger royalty for use of the patented technology than they would have paid ex ante, when the SEP holder faced competition from other technologies. In these circumstances, the SEP holder can be said to have obtained **monopoly power** in the market in which the patented technology is licensed for use in implementing the standard.10

Second, because of lock-in and the implementer’s ongoing infringement, the **potential for litigation looms large** in licensing negotiations. In effect, the parties are negotiating about how to settle an infringement suit, and that negotiation is **heavily influenced** by their predictions as to what the court will do if they cannot agree. This situation is not unique to SEPs; it arises frequently when firms are faced with patent infringement claims for products they have independently developed or technologies they have inadvertently infringed. Patent law addresses such instances by specifying that patent holders are entitled to “**reasonable royalties**,” defined as the royalties that the parties would have negotiated prior to the infringement and thus prior to lock-in.11 Those hypothetical ex ante royalties reflect the market value of the patent license. Notwithstanding the law’s embrace of this principle, however, as a practical matter, patent holders are **generally able to recover more** than the **ex ante value** of the patent when litigation occurs after the implementers are locked in. Further, negotiations in the shadow of litigation after lock-in tend to **result in royalties in excess** of the ex ante or **market value** of the patented technology.12

Third, the shadow of litigation is **particularly problematic** in the communications and technology sector, in which products typically include hundreds or **thousands** of **patented technologies**. A court-ordered injunction involving such products would deprive the implementer of not only the value of the technology covered by the patent-in-suit, but also the value of the **entire product**.13 Implementers that are forced to bear the risk of an injunction are thus **induced to agree to royalties** greater than those that would be **appropriate** if only the value of the patented technology were at stake. Those royalties **systematically provide** SEP holders with **excessive compensation** in comparison with the benchmark of ex ante royalties.

These implications of lock-in and ex post dealings are well-understood: they represent an example of the **general concept** of **lock-in** and **opportunism** developed by Oliver Williamson.14 The Federal Circuit has also recognized the market distortions caused by the inclusion of patented technologies in public standards and the resulting danger of patent holdup involving SEPs.15

For these and other reasons, the SEP holder has ex post monopoly power that, if left unchecked, would enable it to obtain royalties **far in excess** of the royalties that it could earn in a competitive market.16 To address this common problem and limit ex post opportunism by SEP holders, SSOs typically require participants that own SEPs to make certain FRAND commitments. In particular, by requiring a commitment to license on “fair and reasonable” terms, the FRAND requirement aims to prevent, or at least reduce, the **extent of monopoly pricing** by SEP holders. And by requiring a commitment to license on “nondiscriminatory” terms, the FRAND requirement can prevent SEP holders from **extracting monopoly premiums** by selective licensing or, more important, migrating their monopoly power from the FRAND-regulated market to unregulated standard-implementing product markets by licensing to only one or a few implementers or licensing to selected implementers on discriminatorily favorable terms.

**Patent holdup is accentuated by the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in *FTC v. Qualcomm* that permits ICT firms to engage in innovation-stifling conduct with antitrust impunity.**

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Standards can enhance **competition** and **consumer choice**, but they also **massively inflate** the **value** of **patents** deemed **essential** to the standard, and give their owners the power to **sue companies** that implement the standard for **money damages** or **injunctions** to block them from using their SEPs. When standards cover critical features like wireless connectivity, SEP owners wield a huge amount of **“hold-up” power** because their patents allow them to effectively **block access** to the **standard** altogether. That lets them charge **unduly large tolls** to anyone who wants to implement the standard.

To minimize that risk, standard-setting organizations typically require companies that want their patented technology incorporated into a standard to promise in advance to license their SEPs to others on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms. But that promise strikes at a **key tension** between antitrust and patent law: patent owners have **no obligation** to let anyone use technology their patent covers, but to get those technologies incorporated into standards, patent owners usually have to promise that they will give **permission** to anyone who wants to implement the standard as long as they pay a reasonable license fee.

Qualcomm is one of the most **important** and **dominant** companies in the **history** of **wireless** communication standards. It is a multinational conglomerate that has owned patents on every major wireless communication standard since its first CDMA patent in 1985, and it **participates** in the **s**tandard-**s**etting **o**rganization**s** that define those standards. Qualcomm is somewhat unique in that it not only **licenses SEPs**, but also **supplies** the **modem chips** used by a wide range of devices. These include chips that **implement** wireless communication **standards**, which lie at the **heart** of every mobile **computing device**.

Although Qualcomm promised to license its SEPs (including patents essential to CDMA, 3G, 4G, and 5G) on FRAND terms, its conduct has to many looked **unfair**, **unreasonable**, and **highly discriminatory**. In particular, Qualcomm has drawn scrutiny for bundling tens of thousands of patents together—including many that are **not** standard-**essential**—and offering portfolio-only licenses no matter what licensees actually **want** or **need**; refusing to sell modem chips to anyone without a SEP license and threatening to **withhold chips** from companies trying to **negotiate** different license terms; **refusing** to license anyone other than original-equipment manufacturers (OEMs); and insisting on **royalties** calculated as a **percentage** of the **sale price** of a handset sold to end users for hundreds of dollars, despite the minimal contribution of any particular patent to the retail value.

In 2017, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission [sued](https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/01/ftc-charges-qualcomm-monopolizing-key-semiconductor-device-used) Qualcomm for violating both sections of the Sherman Antitrust Act by engaging in a number of anticompetitive SEP licensing practices. In May 2019, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California agreed with the FTC, identifying numerous instances of Qualcomm’s unlawful, anticompetitive conduct in a comprehensive [233-page opinion](https://www.eff.org/document/ftc-v-qualcomm-district-court-opinion). We were pleased to see the FTC take action and the district court credit the overwhelming evidence that Qualcomm’s conduct is corrosive to market-based competition and threatens to cement Qualcomm’s dominance for years to come.

But this month, a panel of judges from the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit unanimously [overturned](https://www.eff.org/document/ninth-circuit-opinion-ftc-v-qualcomm) the district court’s decision, reasoning that Qualcomm’s conduct was “hypercompetitive” but not “anticompetitive,” and therefore not a violation of antitrust law. To reach that result, the Ninth Circuit made the patent grant more powerful and antitrust law weaker than ever.

According to the Ninth Circuit, patent owners don’t have a duty to let anyone use what their patent covers, and therefore Qualcomm had no duty to license its SEPs to anyone. But that framing requires **ignoring** the **promises** Qualcomm made to license its SEPs on **reasonable** and **non-discriminatory** terms—promises that courts in this country and around the world have **consistently** enforced. It also means ignoring antitrust principles like the essential facilities doctrine, which limits the ability of a monopolist with **hold-up power** over an **essential facility** (like a port) to **shut out** rivals. Instead, the Ninth Circuit held rather simplistically that a duty to deal could arise only if the monopolist had provided access, and then reversed its policy.

But even when Qualcomm restricted its licensing policies in critical ways, the Ninth Circuit found reasons to approve those restrictions. For example, Qualcomm stopped licensing its patents to chip manufacturers and started licensing them only to OEMs. This had a major benefit: it let Qualcomm charge a much **higher royalty rate** based on the **high retail price** of the end user devices, like smartphones and tablets, that OEMs make and sell. If Qualcomm had continued to license to chip suppliers, its patents would be “**exhausted**” once the chips were sold to OEMs, extinguishing Qualcomm’s right to assert its patents and control how the chips were used.

Patent exhaustion is a century-old doctrine that protects the rights of consumers to use things they buy without getting the patent owner’s permission again and again. Patent exhaustion is important because it **prevents price-gouging**, but also because it protects **space** for **innovation** by letting people **use things** they buy **freely**, including to build innovations of their own. The doctrine thus helps patent law serve its underlying goal—promoting economic **growth** and **innovation**. In other words, the doctrine of exhaustion is baked into the patent grant; it is not optional. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit wholeheartedly approved of Qualcomm’s efforts to avoid **exhaustion**—even when that meant **cutting off** access to **previous licensees** (chip-makers) in ways that let Qualcomm charge **far more** in **licensing fees** than its SEPs **could possibly** have **contributed** to the **retail value** of the **final product**.

It makes **no sense** that Qualcomm could **contract around** a fundamental principle like patent **exhaustion**, but at the same time **did not assume** any **antitrust duty** to deal under these circumstances. Worse, it’s **harmful** for the **economy**, **innovation**, and **consumers**. Unfortunately, the kind of harm that antitrust law recognizes is limited to harm affecting “competition” or the “competitive process.” Antitrust law, at least as the Ninth Circuit interprets it, doesn’t do nearly enough to address the **harm** downstream consumers experience when they pay **inflated** prices for high-tech devices, and miss out on **innovation** that might have developed from fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory licensing practices.

We hope the FTC sticks to its guns and asks the Ninth Circuit to go en banc and reconsider this decision. Otherwise, antitrust law will become an even **weaker weapon** against **innovation-stifling conduct** in **technology markets.**

**Weakened antitrust enforcement emboldens firms to follow Qualcomm’s lead, which collapses FRAND integrity.**

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While the FRAND process has been highly productive, it is also **fragile**. Firms are tempted to make commitments at the beginning when the incentive to join is large, but **renege** on them **later** when they can profit by doing so. At least in this particular case, private FRAND enforcement **had not worked** very well. Qualcomm had been able to violate FRAND commitments in order to **exclude rivals** and obtain **higher royalties** than FRAND would permit, largely with **impunity**. Other firms will very likely **follow Qualcomm’s lead**. If that happens the **FRAND system** will **fall apart**, doing **irreparable injury** to the modern wireless telecommunications network or, at the very least, **diminishing** the **leadership role** of the United States in preserving effective **network competition**.

While governments can be heavily involved in standard set-ting,9 the implementation of technical standards in information technologies is largely the work of private actors. Government involvement is limited mainly to enforcement of contract, intellectual property, or antitrust law. As private actors, those involved in standard setting or compliance are fully subject to the federal antitrust laws.

This Article addresses one question: when is an SSO participant’s violation of a FRAND commitment an antitrust violation, and if it is, of what kind and what are the implications for remedies? It warns against two extremes. One is thinking that any violation of a FRAND commitment is an antitrust violation as well. In the first instance FRAND obligations are contractual, and most breaches of contract do not violate any antitrust law. The other extreme is thinking that, because a FRAND violation is a breach of contract, it cannot also be an antitrust violation. The question of an antitrust violation does not de-pend on whether the conduct breached a particular agreement but rather on whether it caused competitive harm. This can happen because the conduct restrained trade under section 1 of the Sherman Act, was unreasonably exclusionary under section 2 of the Sherman Act, or amounted to an anticompetitive condition or understanding as defined by section 3 of the Clay-ton Act.10 The end goal is to identify practices that harm com-petition, thereby injuring consumers.

The Ninth Circuit’s Qualcomm decision will make antitrust violations in the context of FRAND licensing much more **difficult to prove**, even in cases where **anticompetitive behavior** and consumer harm **seem clear**.11 Indeed, in this case the court itself acknowledged the harm to consumers but appeared to think that they were not entitled to protection.12 If this decision stands, FRAND obligations will to a **larger extent** have to be settled through private litigation and the federal antitrust enforcement agencies will have a **diminished role**. Anticompetitive behavior by one firm that is **not effectively disciplined** will lead **others** to do the **same thing**.

**A trusted and credible system for ICT innovation is critical to rapid tech diffusion and economic growth---absent FRAND, the system will collapse.**

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It is easy to take a **pessimistic view** about whether the system will **break**. If the current trend continues, the system is **likely** to break at **some point** for the simple reason that companies will **not trust it** anymore. The series of legal disputes witnessed over the past years – sometimes referred to as the “smartphone patent wars” – has been fodder for a pessimistic reading of “the two tales of SEPs”. While it is common in the business world that disputes over patents and licenses are settled in courts, various SEP disputes have revealed **problematic** aspects of the SEP market that are different from those disputes that follow the normal stream of business and contracts. Often, the SEP disputes are less concerned about the rights and boundaries of patents, and more about **antitrust limits** to market **behavior**: they concern market **abusive practices** and **restrictions** to **competition** as much as they are about intellectual property.

If the SEP system actually **does break** at some point, the consequences would be **felt** throughout the **economy**. SEPs have been a **critical part** of the ICT revolution. SEPs have allowed for the **fast rates** of innovation **diffusion** that the world has witnessed over the **past quarter** of a **century**. All the computer and Internet related products and services that people are now dependent upon for their private and professional lives are **intricate webs** of intellectual property. As many as 250,000 patents can be used to claim ownership of some technical specification or design element in a single smartphone (NYT 2012). A laptop, suggests one calculation, implements more than 250 interoperability standards (Biddle et al. 2010), and the number of SEP holders for 3G and 4G standards grew from 2 in 1994 to 130 in 2013 while the number of SEPs rose from fewer than 150 in 1994 to more than 150,000 in 2013 (Galetovic and Gupta 2016). The standardization-body ETSI has registered more than 150,000 declarations of SEPs from companies, and ETSI is just one of many bodies in the world of ICT standardization. For the 3G standard, the same body has about 24,000 patents that have been declared essential. Now, with the economy yet again on the **threshold** of big technological change, a **trusted** and **credible system** for creators and users of technology to standardize proprietary technology would be a boon for **innovation**, **interoperability** and – ultimately – the **consumers**.

And there are reasons for optimism. Although many of the problems in the SEP regimes need to be addressed, the numbers above indicate that the SEP system is in fact attractive to patent holders and SEP implementers. It is easy to see why: neither holders nor implementers are presented with alternative options that on the face of it would be far more profitable for them. In other words, there simply would not be as many patents declared as essential if both creators and users of technology believed the SEP system worked to their disadvantage or was grossly unfair. While the reality for some companies may be that legal disputes and unpredictability prompt them to find other ways than SEPs to get access to key technologies for their products, it remains the case that most stakeholders have strong economic incentives to maintain a balanced SEP system that is trusted.

First, standard essential patents are an asset for creators of technology because, by becoming **essential** to a standard, their volumes of sales for technologies that users value rise **significantly**. As many holders want to raise more revenues for their SEPs and – ideally – have the freedom to contract with buyers on their terms, they can expand their customer base when they agree to sell patented technology in accordance with a set of rules that are designed to prevent SEP holders exploiting the weakness of a customer that has grown dependent on having access to their technology.

Second, SEPs are hugely **beneficial** also to those that buy the licenses – the implementers or users. Through the SEP system, they can access technologies that are **interoperable** and work with different **products** and **functionalities** – and they can do it under conditions that, if history is a guide, in most cases give them stable and predictable terms of contract. As a consequence, both creators and users can focus on their competitive advantages and profit on the economies of scale and specialization. Downstream firms do not need to develop their own upstream technology and upstream firms do not need to package their technologies in end-customer products in order to make their products valuable.

Third, standard-setting organisations (SSOs) also have a big stake in an SEP system that works well – and, like creators and users of technology, they would stand to lose significantly if the SEP system were to collapse.

Lastly, the biggest beneficiaries are individual consumers – those who buy the end products using FRAND-conditioned SEPs. The advent of SEPs and the rules represented by FRAND have enabled a **development** of fast technology creation and contributed to the **rapid diffusion** in ICT goods and ICT-based services. The SEP system has also allowed for new competition, both between existing technologies and brands, and from new ones that have stepped into the market with the ambition to disrupt it, again to the benefit of the consumer. It is **difficult** to imagine that the ICT and digital **development** would have been as **fast** as it has been if SEPs had not been a **central feature** of the **market**.

The changing fortunes of companies operating in the cellular and smartphone market would not have been possible if there had not been an SEP system that supported competition. Now that the **world economy** is on the **doorstep** of new innovations that are dependent on a great number of input technologies – e.g. the Internet-of-Things, transport connectivity and intelligent vehicles – it is **crucially important** for the consumer that a **balanced** and **functioning** SEP system is maintained and that actors in the system **converge** towards it – which would ultimately **meet** their **economic interests**.

**ICT innovation is key to post-COVID economic recovery and long-term growth.**

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Introduction

As the global economy has entered recession in 2020, triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic, the human casualties, and economic **damage** are perceived to be **very large**. Even as the health crisis will gradually become manageable, the impact on economic growth can be **long-lasting** and the recovery path can take several **years**. In particular, growth drivers such as the pace of job creation, income generation and investment may take several years to get back to pre-crisis trends. Initially the productivity of those growth drivers may be of less concern as the mantra of ‘we’ll do what it takes to avoid worse’ is predominant in this phase of the crisis.

However, once the recovery gets underway the **productive** use of **resources** is key to **sustained** growth. While we do not ignore the short-term challenges of the economic recovery, our primary focus in this paper is on the productivity puzzle from a **long-term** perspective. Productivity is driven by technological **change** and **innovation** which, in turn, depends on **investment** in human and physical capital as well as in other ‘missing capitals’ often referred to as intangible assets. Indeed, those investments create a **positive feedback** effect, as the productivity it generates also helps to make more **efficient** usage of **scarce** resources in the future. When properly measured and valued, productivity also provides a critical yardstick to realise a fairer distribution of the gains from economic growth to those who bring the resources to bear. It thereby creates the incentives for people to produce and business to invest helping to drive economic growth and raise living standards.

Unfortunately, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008/2009, many economies around the world, especially advanced economies, have failed to recharge the economy by powering productivity as the key source of growth in the long term. Indeed the latest update of The Conference Board Total Economy Database (July 2020) points at significant weakening in labor productivity growth in Europe up to 2019 (figure 1a–c). While the United States experienced somewhat faster productivity growth from 2017 to 2019 than the Euro Area and the United Kingdom, it still has **not recovered** to the rates of productivity growth from before the global financial crisis either.

The slowdown in productivity growth over the past 15 years has been well documented. There are multiple causes including an exhaustion of catch-up potential in emerging markets impacting economies along entire global value chains, and the drag from the global financial crisis because of low demand and weak investment, too low interest rates causing misallocations an overreliance on cheap labor, and failing fiscal policies (Bauer et al., 2020; Cette et al., 2016; Crafts, 2018; Dieppe, 2020; Fernald et al., 2017; Syverson, 2016).1 Technical measurement issues regarding inputs and outputs may have played a role as well.

In our earlier work we have stressed the importance of time lags in the adoption of new technologies, and in particular the complexity in generating productivity growth from the latest round of new digital technologies since the early 2010s, including the move toward mobile, ubiquitous access to broadband, the rise of cloud storage and advances in artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics (van Ark, 2016a, 2016b; van Ark and O’Mahony, 2016; van Ark et al., 2016).

While the first priority for economic recovery from the COVID-19 crisis is to restore jobs, it is important that any employment-intensive growth path does go together with a **productivity revival**. In this paper, we argue that it is possible to avoid another productivity **slowdown**. Underneath the aggregate figures, there is evidence pointing toward a possible **tipping point** at which many advanced economies may expect to see more **widespread** impacts from the adoption and absorption of **digital technology** on **productivity** and GDP **growth**.

In Section 2 we review the latest literature on the productivity impacts of general purpose technologies (GPTs), including the notion of time lapses through which digital technologies result in faster productivity growth. We also look at patterns by which innovation and productivity effects GPTs emerge across industries and disperse across the economy. We explain why the New Digital Economy (NDE) is especially characterised by long lag effects.

In Section 3 we provide an empirical analysis of productivity growth by industry data to observe whether we can detect a distinct pattern across groups of industries pointing to a structural improvement in recent years. We use a taxonomy on digital intensity by industry which was recently developed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (Calvino et al., 2018), showing that the most digital-intensive industries have experienced a relatively strong performance in terms of labor productivity growth since 2007 and especially since 2013.

In Section 4 of the paper, we discuss the connection between labor and skills in the digital economy, which we believe provides the key to a productivity revival. We developed a new metric on innovation competencies by occupation on the basis of data from the O\*Net database on occupation-specific descriptors in the United States (Hao et al., 2018). When applied to the United Kingdom, we find that innovation competencies point at stronger productivity effects by industry.

In Section 5 we focus on how productivity has been behaving in the short-term during the COVID-19 recession. In particular, we address the potential trade-offs between traditional pro-cyclical recovery effects and scarring effects the recession leaves, especially on the labor market. We argue that increased adoption and usage of digital technologies during the COVID-19 crisis may create a positive productivity effect. In the final section, Section 6, we will review our hypothesis that a productivity revival could be imminent in the light of the recovery from the COVID-19 crisis. In order **not to miss** this **opportunity** again, as happened a decade ago, we argue that a coordinated effort from business and policy is needed, and has to be delivered in such a way that the gains from productivity will be more **widespread** and such that those who provide the resources for growth are incentivised to deliver them in an efficient way.

2. The productivity paradox of the New Digital Economy

It is well known that General Purpose Technologies (GPTs), defined as new methods of producing and inventing new goods and services which are important enough to have a long-term aggregate impact on the economy, can take a significant amount of time to translate to faster **productivity** growth at the **aggregate level** of the economy. This is inherent to the three critical characteristics of a GPT as identified by Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995).2

1. Pervasiveness –The GPT should spread to most sectors.

2. Improvement –The GPT should get better over time and, hence, should keep lowering the costs of its users.

3. Innovation spawning –The GPT should make it easier to invent and produce new products or processes.

Historical analysis has focussed on productivity trends in previous technology phases (Bakker et al., 2019; Crafts, 2004). Recent literature has shown that the information and communication technology (ICT) revolution of the past 50 years can be characterised as a GPT and doesn’t pale with previous GPTs such as steam technology, electricity and the combustion engine. For example, Hempell (2005) concludes that ‘investment in information and communication technologies (ICT) are **closely linked** to **complementary** innovations and are most **productive** in firms with experience from earlier innovations’. In a more recent analysis of the evolution of the Internet, Simcoe (2015) argues that the modularity of the internet has prevented a **fall** in **return** to **investments** in **innovation** by ‘facilitating low-cost **adaptation** of a shared general-purpose technology to the demands of heterogeneous applications’. In a review of the data, Liao et al. (2016) conclude that:

‘...ICT investment does **contribute** to **productivity** but not in the usual manner –we find a positive (but lagged) ICT effect on technological progress. We argue that for a positive ICT role on growth to actually take place, a period of negative relationship between productivity and ICT investment together with ICT-using sectors’ capacity to learn from the embodied new technology was crucial. In addition, it took a learning period with appropriate complementary co-inventions for the new ICT-capital to become effective and its gains to be realised. Our findings provide **solid**, further **empirical evidence** to support ICT as a general purpose technology’.

**Growth solves nuclear war.**

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What Is To Be Done?

The first marching order is to dodge any kind of perpetual war of the sort that George Orwell outlined in  “1984,” which engulfed the three super states of Eastasia, Eurasia, and Oceania, and made possible the totalitarian Big Brother regime. A long-running Cold War-type confrontation would almost certainly take another form than the one that ran from 1945 until the downfall of the Soviet Union.

What prescriptions can be offered in the face of the escalating competition among the three global powers? First, by staying militarily and **economically strong**, the United States will have the resources to deter its peers’ **hawkish behavior** that might otherwise trigger a **major conflict**. Judging by the history of the Cold War, the coming strategic **chess match** with Russia and China will prove **tense** and **demanding**—since all the countries boast **nuclear arms** and long-range ballistic missiles. Next, the United States should widen and sustain willing coalitions of partners, something at which America excels, and at which China and Russia fail conspicuously.

There can be **little room** for **error** in **fraught crises** among **nuclear-weaponized** and hostile powers. Short- and long-term standoffs are likely, as they were during the Cold War. Thus, the playbook, in part, involves a **waiting game** in which each power looks to its rivals to suffer grievous internal problems which could entail a **collapse**, as happened to the Soviet Union.

Some Chinese and Russian experts predict grave domestic problems for each other. They also entertain **similar** thoughts about the United States, which they view as terminally decadent and catastrophically polarized over politics, ethnicity, and the future direction of the country. So, the brewing three-way struggle also involves a **systemic contest**, which will test the competitors’ **economic** and **political institutions**.

At this juncture, the world is entering a standoff among the three great and several not-so-great powers. Averting war, while defending our interests, will prove a challenge, calling for deft policy, political endurance, and **economic growth**, as well as sufficient military force to **keep at bay** aggressive states or **prevail** over them if ever a war breaks out.

**Emergence of smart cities depends on IoT applications of 5G interoperability standards---absent FRAND, excessive royalties will undermine sustainable development.**

**Schwartz 18**, \*Matt Schwartz, Privacy Fellowship Coordinator at ACT, App Association; (March 2nd, 2018, “It’s Smart to be FRANDly: How the FRAND Commitment Will Determine the Future of Smart Cities”, https://actonline.org/2018/03/02/its-smart-to-be-frandly-how-the-frand-commitment-will-determine-the-future-of-smart-cities/)

In December, we [outlined](https://actonline.org/2017/12/18/smart-cities-connecting-your-community-through-technology/%5d) the emergence of **Smart Cities** – cities that harness technological **innovations** like internet of things (**IoT**) devices and data analytics to improve essential infrastructure in growing urban centers. The technological foundation of Smart Cities aims to improve public safety, better allocate resources, and meet the needs of citizens more quickly.

A central element to Smart Cities is the comprehensive network of sensors and devices implemented within buildings, roads, traffic signs, and parking meters that allows them to interact with public, and potentially private-owned, infrastructure. These sensors will “speak” to one another, communicating information about energy usage, traffic density, or other elements of city management that have traditionally either been analyzed separately or not tracked at all. The potential of Smart Cities allows data to flow from previously disconnected branches of the city and be processed in real-time, unlocking previously unknown insights.

The powerful **interoperability** of Smart Cities will rely heavily on **standardized technologies** developed in organizations like the IEEE, which is responsible for standardizing the wi-fi technology we use every day. Standardized technologies often include standard-essential patents (**SEPs**), which, like their name suggests, are patents declared essential to an industry standard by a standards-setting organization. In simple terms, one cannot implement the standardized technology without using the patent.

Like regular patents, the users of SEPs must pay royalties or **licensing fees** to the patent owner before they may use it. For example, if a manufacturing company wants to make an IoT device interoperable with a 5G network, the manufacturer must pay a licensing fee to the owner of the SEP that is essential to the 5G standard. SEPs play a **vital role** in the new innovations we enjoy and have come to expect, and because of the value of these patents, SEP holders have the ability to demand **high license fees** from those who wish to implement the standard. To offset this **competition issue**, many SEP holders **voluntarily** agree to license their SEPs to any willing licensee under fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (**FRAND**) terms.

While wi-fi and LTE are standards that will be vital to Smart City deployment, countless new standardized technologies are being developed that will be integral to any fully-operational Smart City. With **reasonable access** to SEPs, assured by the FRAND commitment, innovators can enjoy the **legal** and **business certainty** they need to **compete**. While the meaning of the FRAND commitment continues to be refined – as evidenced by the development of SEP best practices recently launched by the App Association in Europe – its foundations are well-established.

But what happens when SEP holders do not abide by the FRAND licensing commitment, or simply refuse to license at all? Sadly, small and medium-sized companies would be **forced** to accept **untenable** licensing terms, but more realistically, they would be **priced out** of using the standard **altogether**. As a result, it would impose a **barrier** to **innovation** that would result in **fewer products** offered to consumers or cities eager to implement **IoT technologies**. For example, many hope the rise of autonomous vehicles will be seamlessly integrated into the Smart City network. But how beneficial would it be if only some autonomous vehicle brands are able to license the technology needed to communicate with traffic lights, simply because of the market power of a chipmaker? The FRAND commitment is an important backstop to that unfortunate possibility.

It is vital for SEP holders to honor FRAND licensing terms, if not for small and medium-sized innovators, then for the sustainability of future Smart Cities. FRAND creates a platform for innovation, providing a floor on which companies can stand, innovate, and compete. If the foundation of the FRAND commitment is reneged, American innovators pay a **steep price** – not only do they lose a **key component** of product **development** and **market entry**, but they are also left with years of expensive negotiations and litigation if they choose to challenge the licensing practice. What’s more, the **confidence** developed in the open standards development system is **shaken**, and Smart Cities have fewer choices in IoT solutions for their future.

To achieve the promise of Smart Cities, a balanced standards ecosystem is essential. We must allow small and medium-sized developers to **leverage industry standards** for innovation and prevent cost-prohibitive royalty structures and negotiating practices that are **detrimental** to **competition**, while also ensuring that SEP owners can protect their intellectual property and be fairly compensated for its use. The FRAND commitment continues to be the **best framework** to achieve this balance, and **adherence** to its **principles** will determine the **future** and **success** of **Smart Cities**.

**Climate change is anthropogenic and causes extinction---5G-enabled smart cities are critical for mitigation and adaptation.**

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Currently, the **entire planet** is at risk due to continual **climate change** [1–3]. The recorded increase in average temperature across the world in the past hundred years, and the associated changes attributed to this, are known as global warming. Many scientists are convinced by the published evidence that this change is **anthropogenic** and resulted from the **elevated emission levels** of global greenhouse gases (GHGs) [4,5]. Gases such as water vapor, carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and ozone are responsible for the absorption and emission of thermal radiation. These changes in the relative quantities of the GHGs induce a proportional change in the amount of preserved solar energy. Presently, the accepted indicator for global warming is the sustained rise in the mean temperature worldwide. This definition is designed to account for the fact that there may be some localized exceptions to this rise. For example, there may be cooling experienced in a region while the global temperature may increase altogether, hence the need for average temperature. A key concern with the GHGs trapping of more heat in the atmosphere is that it affects both climate and short scale weather patterns. Consequently, it results in **greater numbers** of **adverse weather events** such as storms, heat waves, cold snaps, droughts, and fires [6]. **Climate-related risks** to health, livelihoods, food security, water supply, human safety, and economic growth are projected to **increase** with global warming of 1.5 ◦C [7] and further increase further at 2 ◦C, as shown in Figure 1. In addition, the risks to global aggregated economic growth due to the climate change impacts are projected to be lower at 1.5 ◦C than at 2 ◦C by the end of this century.

Carbon dioxide has the most **substantial effect** on global warming [8]. Although it was once assumed to have an ~100 year lifespan in the atmosphere, careful studies revealed that the situation is far worse, with three-quarters of the gas expected to remain for a time in the region of up to ~1000 years, with the remainder lasting for an indefinite period of time [9]. It was indicated that the present impacts of humanity on the atmosphere can certainly cause a long term problem [10]. Carbon dioxide is released when oil, coal, and other fossil fuels are burnt for the energy we use to power our homes, cars, and smartphones. By **lessening** its **usage**, we can **curb** our own **contribution** to climate change while saving money. The first challenge is eliminating the burning of coal, oil, and, eventually, natural gas. Oil is the lubricant of the global economy as it is hidden inside such ubiquitous items as plastic and corn, fundamental to the transportation of both consumers and goods. Coal is the substrate, supplying roughly half of the electricity worldwide, a percentage that is likely to grow according to the International Energy Agency (IEA). In fact, buildings contribute up to 43% of all the greenhouse gas emissions worldwide [11], even though investing in thicker insulation and other cost-effective as well as temperature-regulating strategies can save money in the long run. Investment in **new infrastructures**, or radical **upgradation** of the existing highways and transmission lines, may help to **reduce** greenhouse gas **emissions**, yielding economic growth in the developing countries.

Nations across the globe have kept very **high targets** to reducing their GHG discharges [12,13]. In order to meet these goals, **considerable reductions** in city energy usage is required. At a global scale, urban communities represent over half (55%) of the population, which is predicted to reach **68%** by the middle of this century [14]. Urban areas claim ownership of the **highest levels** of energy use, gas emission, and also the largest local economy. As such, it is **crucial** for urban areas to **reduce** their **consumption** and utilize **renewable sources** wherever available to reduce their gas discharge levels. Smart cities often utilize **digital sensors** to measure and transmit data about the levels of GHGs in the city at that moment, as a means of tackling them [15]. The **efficacy** of such a system is thus **reliant** on the network used to collate and analyze the data collected as an extant network. The mobile telecommunications networks offer a **convenient solution** to this desire, as their pre-existence has the clear benefit of reducing costs compared to the design and implementation of a novel system. It is recognized that smart cities will certainly act as the key players meeting these ambitious targets [16,17]. In this study, we focused primarily on the potential applications of 5G network technology to control climate change in Singapore. In addition, a **clear overview** of the **sustainability benefits** of introducing **5G** technology **compatible** smart cities, buildings, and farms in all aspects of urbanization is provided. Herein, the main purpose is to tackle the **negative outcomes** associated with **anthropogenic climate change**, with a particular focus on the contributions that are best made by the telecoms network operators.

Climate change is one of the most **challenging problems** that humanity has ever faced. Presently, hundreds of millions of lives, innumerable species, entire ecosystems, health, economy, and the **future habitability of this planet** are at risk. Fortunately, climate change is **solvable**, we just need to **wisely exploit** the **existing technologies** and **sciences**. Climate change mitigation is a pressing international need in which many management actions are required. The development of 5G technology has been largely driven by smart mobile devices and advanced communication technologies. It may thus serve as a **technical enabler** for a whole new range of business opportunities, energy, and facilities management, together with industrial applications. Moreover, it may enable different devices to work together seamlessly. Definitely, the 5G cellular network technology is expected to **revolutionize** the **global industries** with **profound effects** on the savings of energy, waste generation and recycling, and water resources management, thus **reducing** the **climate change impacts**.

**1AC — Cybersecurity**

**Advantage 2 is Cybersecurity —**

**Aggressive patent strategies create structural flaws in 5G standardization that imperils domestic cybersecurity---market competition reduces the incidence of vulnerability and severity of attacks.**

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III. COMPETITION AND CYBERSECURITY

In addition to the historical review done so far, another approach to understanding the relationship among patents, competition, and national security is to consider the role of **cybersecurity**. There is little doubt that computer system vulnerabilities that enable **hacking** and **spread** of **computer exploits** are a **threat** to the **nation’s defenses**, so better cybersecurity is a **key part** of national security strategy.155

**Strong competition** can thus **complement** national security by enhancing domestic cybersecurity, and **patent assertion** that **unduly weakens** competition **detracts** from cybersecurity.156 Competition promotes better cybersecurity in at least two ways. First, multiple studies show that competition encourages firms to improve their products on multiple vectors including cybersecurity. Second, competition avoids a situation that security experts call a “monoculture,” which increases vulnerability to severe cyberattacks. As former Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff wrote recently, “We need **competition** and **multiple providers**, not a potentially vulnerable technological monoculture,” to **guarantee** national security.157 Thus, cybersecurity provides a **useful lens** for understanding how **unfettered** patent assertion and **licensing** can **detract** from **national security**.

A. Cybersecurity as Competitive Value-Add

Competition enhances national security by **reducing** the **incidence** of technical **vulnerabilities**. That effect is **especially important** for security **sensitive systems** such as **mobile telecommunications**.

Intuitively, a **causal chain** from **competition** to **cybersecurity** makes logical sense. Computer security is a value-added benefit to consumers, so firms in competitive markets are likely to use security to gain an edge over their competitors.158 In monopolized markets, though, there may be less **external impetus** to **test products** for flaws, and the **monopolist** may **choose** to **focus less** on **security** and more on new product features or increased product quality.

Economic research confirms these hypotheses about competition leading to better cybersecurity. A 2009 empirical study of web browsers considered the impact of market concentration on the amount of time that vendors took to fix security vulnerabilities as they were discovered.159 The study found that the **presence** of more **competitors** correlated with **faster cybersecurity** response—a reduction of 8–10 days in response time per additional market rival.160 Similarly, business researchers in 2005 modeled incentives for firms to engage in sharing of cybersecurity information, and concluded that the “**inclination** to **share information** and **invest** in **security technologies** increases as the **degree** of **competitiveness** in an industry increases.”161 Another study found that, where two software firms are in competition, at least one will be willing to take on **some degree** of **risk** and **responsibility** for cybersecurity, whereas a monopoly software firm will **consistently fail** to accept such responsibility.162 To be sure, an unpublished study from 2017 found that some market concentration can make firms more responsive to cybersecurity issues, but only to a point: “being in a dominant position reduces the positive effect of having less competitors on the responsiveness of the vendor,” and indeed the “more dominant the firm is, the less rapid it is in releasing security patches.”163 This research confirms that competition is more conducive to cybersecurity.

It is not hard to see how this applies to emerging communication technologies markets. In the absence of competition, the above research suggests that device manufacturers, chip makers, and software developers will **lack incentives** to **respond** to **vulnerabilities**, to **share information** about cybersecurity practices and issues, and to **take responsibility** for security matters. Mobile phone chips have had their share of cybersecurity failures already.164 **The best way to flush out ongoing and future cybersecurity issues is to maintain competitive pressure at all levels of the supply chain.**

B. Vulnerabilities of “Monocultures”

A second reason why monopoly undermines cybersecurity is that monopoly leads to a “**monoculture**” of single-vendor products, opening the door to **massive** systemic **failure** in the case of a **cyberattack**. Computer researchers developed the theory of software monocultures in the early 2000s, in response to the regular phenomenon of computer viruses and other attacks spreading rapidly by exploiting flaws in the dominant operating system at the time, Microsoft Windows.165 Where a computer system such as Windows has a commanding share of users, a virus that **exploits** a **flaw** in that system can quickly **spread** to **infect** a whole **interconnected ecosystem**. An operating system monopoly thus enables fast and easy spread of cyberattacks, and better cybersecurity would be achieved through greater diversity in online systems.166 As one research group posited, “a network architecture that **supports** a collection of **heterogeneous network** elements for the same **functional capability** offers a **greater possibility** of **surviving** security **attacks** as compared to **homogeneous networks**.”167

There has been considerable study of the theory that computer monocultures are **naturally** more **vulnerable** to attacks.168 In one study, computer science researchers reviewed a catalog of 6,340 software vulnerabilities recorded in 2007, to compare whether comparable software would share the same flaws.169 Of the 2,627 vulnerabilities applicable to application software (as opposed to operating systems, web scripts, and other software components), only 29 (1.1%) applied to substitute products from different vendors but providing the same functionality.170 By contrast, different versions of a single software product were found to share vulnerabilities 84.7% of the time.171 Thus, software monocultures share **exploitable flaws** even when there is some **variation** in **versions** across the **monoculture**; by contrast, diversity in software is almost **guaranteed** to **prevent** a **single flaw** from **affecting** all **users**.

In the case of 5G and wireless mobile communications, a monoculture is an **especially concerning** possibility. To the extent that systems such as smart city sensors or communication networks are **widely deployed** in a monoculture fashion, a **widespread attack** could have **devastating** consequences, potentially blacking out a region and affecting essential services such as 911.172 A monoculture that is vulnerable to so-called “**rootkits**” or “**backdoors**”—maliciously installed software that enable **bad actors** to commandeer systems—could also enable **mass surveillance** or **spying** by private hackers or foreign governments.173 The presence of systems from **multiple vendors** would mitigate these possibilities.

The monoculture theory is not without critics, but a review of those criticisms shows them to be inapplicable to contemporary communication technologies. Some critics suggest that software diversity imposes **unwarranted costs** on firms who must **forego** economies of scale and devise seemingly duplicative yet different setups of computer systems.174 But those concerns **largely focus** on the situation where a **single firm** produces and manages heterogeneous systems, concerns that are **avoided** where **heterogeneity** arises **naturally** through **competition** between two **unrelated** firms. Critics also argue that technological measures can create “artificial diversity” through automated randomization of software code, so software engineers can purportedly solve monoculture issues and device users need not worry about the issue.175 But even these critics acknowledge that artificial diversity techniques are often **insufficient** because they must make **assumptions** about what **aspects** of the **technology** are **most vulnerable** to **attack**, and they **concede** that artificial diversity **cannot stop** attacks involving operation of **legitimate** software functions in **undesirable** ways (sending spam emails or deleting document files, for example).176

It is widely recognized that a monoculture is **unavoidable** in at least one respect: Most connected devices will need to **conform** to technical **standards**.177 5G, for example, is a technical standard developed by a private industry consortium called 3GPP.178 A **flaw** in any such standard would render **all mobile devices** implementing the standard **vulnerable** to an **identical attack**.179 Avoiding these sorts of **systemic flaws** in standards requires rigorous **development**, **analysis**, and **testing** of the standard in the development process, which in turn requires ensuring that **as many firms** as **possible**, especially firms that share basic American values, are **involved** in the **development** of those **standards**.180 Thus, the necessary **standardization** of **information** and **communication technologies** is perhaps the most **important reason** why a **competitive** communication technology **market** is **essential** to **cybersecurity** and national security.

**Insecure technical standards cause inevitable systemic grid collapse---extinction.**

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The infrastructure was essential, ubiquitous and providing basic functionality for everything in daily life from water to heat and transportation. And in an instant it was gone, plunging tens of thousands of residents into a life-threatening crisis. This is, of course, the narrative of the recent debacle in Texas, where a winter storm overwhelmed the state’s electrical grid and brought the state to a near-total blackout. But it should also be interpreted as a preemptive **warning** of what Americans will face from the next generation of the **internet** and the new realm of cybersecurity risk it will **dramatically** amplify.

Both forms of infrastructure—a state-run electrical grid and the **5G** and “**internet of things**” future to which we are rapidly hurtling—share three attributes. First, their construction reflects a lack of imagination about the danger that can quickly **coalesce** when seemingly remote threat scenarios become real. Second, compounding a lack of analytic imagination is an absence of preparedness. Third, for both the Texas electrical grid and the emerging internet, public policy protections are either meager or completely absent.

In planning for the resilience of its electrical grid, public officials in Texas **discounted** the potentially devastating disruption that could occur from **unpredictable** events—whether related to climate change or just a once-a-century anomaly. They also eschewed precautions other states take seriously by allowing for the interconnection of electrical grid supply chains across their borders, ostensibly because of their ideological rejection of federal regulatory oversight governing such arrangements.

As the United States builds out a new national **5G** cyber-physical communications network through private service providers, Americans similarly **discount** the **risks**—myriad in their diversity and severity—that are **orders** of **magnitude** more **significant** than what Texas confronted recently. More physical things than people are already connected. The super empowered internet of tomorrow, known among some in the field as the “internet of everything,” will exceed by **tens of billions** of devices the number of connections between individuals simply communicating via social media or digital screens.

This confronts policymakers with an imminent threat: A cyber outage is **no longer** about losing digital communications but about losing basic **societal functioning** and even **human life**. The failure of imagination is to think of the SolarWinds attack on U.S. federal agencies and tech companies as a **worst-case scenario**. The failure of imagination is to think of cybersecurity through a content-centric lens rather than as possible attacks on the material world. The emergence of internet-connected cardiac devices, digitally dependent cars, and internet-connected agriculture systems portend the stakes of a cyberattack to **health care**, economic and **social functioning**, and **food security.**

The United States should be prepared for, and certainly not be caught by surprise by, such cyberattacks. Yet, the internet of everything is notoriously **insecure**. Internet-connected physical objects are not necessarily upgradeable. Nor do they come with adequate default security and encryption. The 5G infrastructure that helps connect digital objects has been at the center of debates over Chinese espionage. Industrial cyber-physical **systems** are based on **technical standards** that have not been collaboratively vetted for **security** and **interoperability**. One of the most infamous cyberattacks—the so-called Mirai botnet that took down major media sites and corporations—hijacked these insecure objects in homes to carry out the assault. The United States is not yet prepared.

Finally, in the race to conceive and deploy effective public policy responses, the U.S. government as a whole is hardly more anticipatory or synthesized in its response to potential calamity than the state of Texas. The focus of U.S. cyber policy remains on information policy issues such as disinformation, manipulation and violent speech rather than securing the digital world that now powers our material day-to-day lives. The Biden administration confronts an enormous challenge in crafting a comprehensive strategy to the cybersecurity risks foreshadowed by the ruinous experience in Texas and its management of vital infrastructure. While the digital world has leapt from two-dimensional to three-dimensional space, cyber policy has not at all jumped from 2D to 3D.

This failure of imagination, preparedness and policy protection must not be America’s cyber future; the stakes are far **too high** and the costs are far **too great.** The Texas disaster is a potent illustration of what has always been true: Our digital society and economy are extremely vulnerable and grow more porous and subject to penetration day by day. As digital sensors and cyber control systems become further embedded in physical infrastructure like energy systems, agriculture and transportation, there is no longer a separation between security of the **“real” world** and security of the **online world**. They are **entangled** and increasingly **enmeshed**—and policy has yet to catch up to either envisioning or mitigating the looming threats the U.S. confronts.

If the energy grid cannot weather a winter storm, how can it be expected to withstand a major cyberattack? What other vital forms of national infrastructure—ranging from water, bridges, highways and roads, and ultimately our day-to-day financial system—are **comparably** at **risk**? As Texas dramatizes, it is neither **hyperbolic** nor **exaggerated** to assert that **our survival** could now depend on **securing** the inevitable **cyber-physical future** that is accelerating with **stunning rapidity**.

#### Cyberwar is increasingly likely---SolarWind emboldens hackers to undermine critical infrastructure and nuclear supply chains.

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Cyberattacks are no longer just a matter of cybersecurity, they directly threaten a country’s national security. Cyberattacks alter the character of warfare—much like nuclear weapons once did, allowing adversaries to potentially cross enemy lines to harm large numbers of innocent civilians.

Today’s malicious actors can now seek to cause physical damage from remote locations through digital channels, wreaking devastation on a country at levels that previously would have required a kinetic attack.

On February 8, 2021, hackers breached the Bruce T. Haddock Water Treatment Plant in Oldsmar, Fla. using known software vulnerabilities in an attempt to poison the local water supply with sodium hydroxide—also known as lye. They accessed the plant through its industrial control system (ICS)—a system designed to allow for remote control and supervision of the plant. Taking over the plant’s controls, hackers increased parts of the chemical, used to [adjust the acidity and remove metals from drinking water](https://www.foxnews.com/politics/senate-intel-chairman-florida-water-plant-cyberattack), to one hundred times over the normal level. The system used an [old version of Windows, was accessible with a shared password, and had no firewall protection against intrusions](https://techgenix.com/florida-water-treatment-facility-cyberattack/). Thankfully, [a supervisor noticed the dangerous change in time whilst working remotely](https://www.govtech.com/em/safety/Cyberattack-on-Water-Treatment-Facility-Suggests-More-to-Come.html), averting a crisis that may have caused chemical burns and blindness among those exposed to the toxic chemical.

U.S. government officials have recently expressed concerns about similar vulnerabilities across water and energy sectors and other critical infrastructure including [health, emergency services, food and agriculture, and transportation systems](https://www.foxnews.com/politics/senate-intel-chairman-florida-water-plant-cyberattack). The cyberattack on the water plant occurred just a week before a major winter storm led to a widespread blackout and water crisis across Texas. [More than five million](https://time.com/5939633/texas-power-outage-blackouts/) went without power and running water for several days, illustrating the fragility of such interconnected infrastructure and the physical devastation that could be caused in the event of a cyberattack targeting the grid.

Critical infrastructure is not alone in its vulnerabilities to cyberattacks with physical implications—supply chains are also at risk. For at least a span of months (if not years), hackers have [exploited vulnerabilities](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2020_United_States_federal_government_data_breach) in software from Microsoft, VMWare and the Texas-based company [SolarWinds](https://www.solarwinds.com/) to compromise data security in at least 200 organizations in the U.S. government and other agencies around the world.

Although the SolarWinds attack appears to be a [case of classic espionage by Russia](https://www.securityinfowatch.com/cybersecurity/article/21206223/more-questions-than-answers-as-solarwinds-breach-probe-expands) via the U.S. supply chain, there are aspects of the attack that also illustrate the potential for achieving physical effects via digital channels. As early as [March 2020](https://www.securityinfowatch.com/cybersecurity/article/21206223/more-questions-than-answers-as-solarwinds-breach-probe-expands), Russian hackers breached the Orion network management software designed by SolarWinds, a federal contractor, and planted malicious code likely intended to gain access to sensitive information. Evidence of malware was first detected [in December by a cybersecurity company](https://www.newsweek.com/colorado-representative-says-solarwinds-hack-could-cyber-equivalent-pearl-harbor-1555994) that also uses the Orion software. The impact of the SolarWinds cyberattack spanned [thousands of networks](https://www.securityinfowatch.com/cybersecurity/article/21206223/more-questions-than-answers-as-solarwinds-breach-probe-expands) at [nine federal agencies and 100 private sector companies](https://www.cyberscoop.com/solarwinds-cyber-espionage-russia-neuberger/), including the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), which is responsible for overseeing the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile.

Although NNSA claims there was no impact to classified systems, officials found [evidence of attempted intrusion](http://www.politico.com/news/2020/12/22/nuclear-weapons-agency-congress-hacking-450184) in unclassified systems—although, according to the NNSA Public Affairs office, the system in question was used for business purposes, not for transport of nuclear weapons and materials. The agency also detected attempts to gain access to servers at the Los Alamos National Laboratory—one of three nuclear weapons labs. [NNSA immediately disconnected the software from relevant networks](https://www.energy.gov/articles/doe-update-cyber-incident-related-solar-winds-compromise), removing the possibility for deleterious effects. While hackers were not likely targeting the transport of nuclear weapons, the [vulnerabilities of nuclear weapons](https://www.nap.edu/read/11538/chapter/6#112) [while en-route](https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1409912) [between secure locations](https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1348_web.pdf) are well known.

The exact objectives for the SolarWinds cyberattack remain unclear, but the vast extent of its reach may demonstrate to U.S. adversaries the significant potential of cyberattacks for achieving physical ends, including the possibility of stealing nuclear weapons. However, the incident is not the first major one from which malicious actors have deduced such capabilities—[consider the lessons from the NotPetya attack in 2017](https://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-talk/computing/it/notpetya-latest-ransomware-is-a-warning-note-from-the-future). Russian hackers spread malicious code through a popular accounting software developed by a Ukrainian business across many countries in Europe, eventually infecting tens of thousands of computers around the world. In addition to rendering infected computers useless, the attack shut down the global operations of the Maersk shipping company and caused major traffic congestion on the roads near ports in the United States. It also slowed operations of Merck & Co, Inc., a major producer of drugs and vaccines in the U.S., [reducing production capacity for a short period of time](https://www.fiercepharma.com/manufacturing/merck-has-hardened-its-defenses-against-cyber-attacks-like-one-last-year-cost-it). Even a classic espionage or sabotage incident may carry significant potential for physical damage.

The [Biden administration has already issued guidance](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/02/24/executive-order-on-americas-supply-chains/) for shoring up vulnerabilities in U.S. supply chains, but much more needs to be done to protect critical infrastructure and dissuade malicious actors from exploiting digital channels to achieve physical ends. In an era of hybrid and gray zone warfare, cyberattacks are attractive to nations seeking to undermine their adversaries due to challenges of attribution and the associated benefit of deniability. In the future, these nations may also come to see cyberattacks with physical effects as a new form of warfare—a Trojan horse in the form of their adversary’s own infrastructure or supply chains. In so doing, they can cross enemy lines and cause damage and destruction without defeating any military forces.

**Actors have the means and motivations to strike critical infrastructure.**

**Wintch 21**, \*Timothy M. Wintch, an active-duty Major in the United States Air Force. He is currently a graduate student at the Oettinger School of Science & Technology Intelligence, National Intelligence University, in Bethesda, Maryland. Mr. Wintch has over 11 years of experience in command-and-control operations as an Air Battle Manager. He holds a Bachelor of Arts in Politics from the University of California, Santa Cruz, and a Master of Arts in Military Studies from American Military University. (April 20th, 2021, “PERSPECTIVE: Cyber and Physical Threats to the U.S. Power Grid and Keeping the Lights on”, https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/)

Among critical infrastructure sectors in the U.S., energy is perhaps the most crucial of the 16 sectors defined by the Department of Homeland Security. This sector is **so vital** because it provides the energy necessary to run **every other** critical infrastructure sector. However, the U.S. power grid, the backbone of the energy sector, is built upon an aging skeleton that is becoming increasingly **vulnerable** every day. Whether from terrorists or nation-states like Russia and China, the power grid is susceptible to not just physical attacks, but also to **cyber** intrusion as well. However, much of this threat can be mitigated if the U.S. takes the appropriate steps to safeguard the power grid and avoid a potential catastrophe in the future.

Since Sept. 11, 2001, terrorism on U.S. soil has been at the forefront of American consciousness. Critical infrastructure provides an **appealing** target because of the disproportionally **large impact** even a **small attack** can have on the sectors. In particular, the power grid represents a particularly lucrative target, both in terms of the ease of access and the large impact it can make. The National Research Council stated that the U.S. power grid is “vulnerable to intelligent multi-site attacks by knowledgeable attackers intent on causing maximum physical damage to key components on a wide geographical scale.”[[1]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/" \l "_ftn1) Additionally, the physical security of transmission and distribution systems is difficult due to the **dispersed** nature of these key components, which in turn is advantageous to attackers as it reduces the likelihood of their capture.[[2]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/" \l "_ftn2) From 2002-2012, approximately 2,500 physical attacks occurred against transmission lines and towers worldwide and approximately 500 attacks against transformer substations.[[3]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/" \l "_ftn3) Terrorists have the **motivation** to attack the U.S. power grid but the very nature of the grid makes it highly vulnerable. The power grid is not only at risk from physical attacks, but also nation-state cyberattacks.

One nation that has shown both the **capability** and **intent** to use attacks against critical energy infrastructure is Russia, as demonstrated in their 2015 annexation of Crimea from Ukraine. A Russian cyber threat group known as Sandworm, which used its BlackEnergy malware, attacked Ukrainian computer systems that provide remote control of the Ukraine power grid.[[4]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/" \l "_ftn4) This attack, and another in 2016, each left the capital Kiev without power, prompting cyber experts to raise concern about the same malware already existing in NATO and the U.S. power grids.[[5]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/" \l "_ftn5) In any conflict between Russia and NATO, not only would similar cyberattacks pose a threat, but so would potential physical attacks severing fuel oil and natural gas lines to Western Europe. Russia has both the capability and intent to attack critical infrastructure, particularly power grids, during future conflicts in their “hybrid warfare” approach.

Another nation that has the capability to attack critical energy infrastructure is China, representing a threat to not just the U.S. energy infrastructure but also that of our allies whose support would be vital in a major conflict. A recent NATO report highlighted this threat from China’s Belt and Road Initiative, stating that “[China’s] foreign direct investment in strategic sectors [such as energy generation and distribution] …raises questions about whether access and control over such infrastructure can be maintained, particularly in crisis when it would be required to support the military.”[[6]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/" \l "_ftn6) Like Russia, China has been **active** with cyber **intrusions** in U.S. energy **infrastructure**. The Mission Support Center at Idaho National Laboratory characterized these as attacks as “multiple intrusions into US ICS/SCADA [Industrial Control Systems/Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition] and smart grid tools [that] may be aimed more at intellectual property theft and gathering intelligence to bolster their own infrastructure, but it is likely that they are also using these intrusions to develop capabilities to attack the [**bulk** electric system], as well.”[[7]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/" \l "_ftn7) China, therefore, has both the **capability** and **intent** to conduct cyber intrusions and attacks for myriad reasons.

Another arm of this threat is the reliance the U.S. energy industry has on imports from China, especially transformers. In early 2020, federal officials seized a transformer in the port of Houston that had been imported by the Jiangsu Huapeng Transformer Company before sending it to Sandia National Laboratory in Albuquerque. Sandia is contracted by the U.S. Department of Energy for mitigating national security threats.[[8]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/" \l "_ftn8) The Wall Street Journal reported that “Mike Howard, chief executive of the Electric Power Research Institute, a utility-funded technical organization, said that the diversion of a huge, expensive transformer is so unusual – in his experience, unprecedented – that it suggests officials had significant security concerns.”[[9]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/" \l "_ftn9) Previously destined for the Washington Area Power Administration’s Ault, Colo., substation, the transformer is believed to have been seized due to “backdoor” exploitable hardware emplaced by the Chinese prior to shipment.[[10]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/#_ftn10) Shortly after these events, President Trump issued Executive Order 13920, “[Securing the United States Bulk-Power System](https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-securing-united-states-bulk-power-system/),” essentially limiting the import of Chinese-built critical energy infrastructure components due to concerns about cybersecurity.[[11]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/#_ftn11) Interestingly, Jiangsu Huapeng “boasted that it supported 10 percent of New York City’s electricity load.”[[12]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/#_ftn12)

Franklin Kramer, the former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, testified before a U.S. House of Representatives Energy and Commerce subcommittee during an energy and power hearing in 2011 and said that a “highly-coordinated and structured cyber, physical, or blended attack on the **bulk power** system, however, could result in long-term (**irreparable**) damage to key system components in multiple simultaneous or near-**simultaneous strikes**.” He added that “an outage could result with the potential to affect a wide geographic area and cause large population centers to lose power for **extended** periods.”[[13]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/#_ftn13) Even the inclusion of features such as smart grids to the overall grid structure poses new **vulnerabilities** through their connectivity. Kramer stated that “such connectivity means that the **distribution** system could be a **key vector** for a national security attack on the grid.”[[14]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/#_ftn14)

**Those attacks cause accidental nuclear escalation.**

**Klare 19**, \*Michael T. Klare is a professor emeritus of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College and senior visiting fellow at the Arms Control Association; (November 19th, “Cyber Battles, Nuclear Outcomes? Dangerous New Pathways to Escalation”, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation)

Yet another pathway to escalation could arise from a cascading series of **cyberstrikes** and **counterstrikes** against **vital national infrastructure** rather than on military targets. All major powers, along with Iran and North Korea, have developed and deployed cyberweapons designed to disrupt and destroy major elements of an adversary’s key **economic systems**, such as **power grids**, **financial systems**, and **transportation networks**. As noted, Russia has **infiltrated** the U.S. **electrical grid**, and it is widely believed that the United States has done the same in Russia.[12](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation#endnote12) The Pentagon has also devised a plan known as “Nitro Zeus,” intended to immobilize the entire Iranian economy and so force it to capitulate to U.S. demands or, if that approach failed, to pave the way for a crippling air and missile attack.[13](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation#endnote12)

The danger here is that **economic attacks** of this sort, if undertaken during a period of tension and crisis, could lead to an **escalating series** of **tit-for-tat attacks** against ever more **vital elements** of an adversary’s critical infrastructure, producing **widespread chaos** and **harm** and eventually leading one side to initiate **kinetic attacks** on **critical** military **targets**, risking the **slippery slope** to **nuclear conflict**. For example, a Russian cyberattack on the U.S. power grid could trigger U.S. attacks on Russian energy and financial systems, causing widespread disorder in both countries and generating an impulse for even more devastating attacks. At some point, such attacks “could lead to major conflict and possibly nuclear war.”[14](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation#endnote14)

These are by no means the only pathways to escalation resulting from the offensive use of cyberweapons. Others include efforts by **third parties**, such as **proxy states** or **terrorist organizations**, to provoke a global nuclear crisis by causing **early-warning systems** to generate **false readings** (“spoofing”) of missile launches. Yet, they do provide a **clear indication** of the **severity** of the **threat**. As states’ reliance on cyberspace grows and cyberweapons become more powerful, the **dangers** of **unintended** or **accidental escalation** can only grow more **severe**.

**Cyber-compromised NC3 causes nuclear war.**

**Klare 19**, \*Michael T. Klare is a professor emeritus of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College and senior visiting fellow at the Arms Control Association; (November 19th, “Cyber Battles, Nuclear Outcomes? Dangerous New Pathways to Escalation”, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation>)

The Nuclear-Cyber Connection

These links exist because the NC3 systems of the United States and other nuclear-armed states are **heavily dependent** on **computers** and other **digital processors** for virtually **every aspect** of their **operation** and because those systems are **highly vulnerable** to cyberattack. Every nuclear force is composed, most basically, of weapons, early-warning radars, launch facilities, and the top officials, usually presidents or prime ministers, empowered to initiate a nuclear exchange. Connecting them all, however, is an extended network of **communications** and **data-processing** systems, all reliant on **cyberspace**. Warning systems, ground- and space-based, must constantly watch for and analyze possible enemy missile launches. Data on actual threats must rapidly be **communicated** to decision-makers, who must then weigh possible responses and **communicate** chosen outcomes to launch facilities, which in turn must provide attack vectors to delivery systems. All of this involves **operations** in **cyberspace**, and it is in this domain that great power rivals seek **vulnerabilities** to exploit in a constant struggle for advantage.

The use of cyberspace to gain an advantage over adversaries takes many forms and is not always aimed at nuclear systems. China has been accused of engaging in widespread **cyberespionage** to steal technical secrets from U.S. firms for economic and military advantages. Russia has been accused, most extensively in the Robert Mueller report, of exploiting cyberspace to **interfere** in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Nonstate actors, including terrorist groups such as al Qaeda and the Islamic State group, have used the internet for **recruiting** combatants and spreading fear. Criminal groups, including some thought to be allied with state actors, such as North Korea, have used cyberspace to **extort money** from banks, municipalities, and individuals.[4](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation#endnote04) Attacks such as these occupy most of the time and attention of civilian and military cybersecurity organizations that attempt to thwart such attacks. Yet for those who worry about strategic stability and the risks of nuclear escalation, it is the threat of cyberattacks on NC3 systems that provokes the greatest concern.

This concern stems from the fact that, despite the immense effort devoted to protecting NC3 systems from cyberattack, no enterprise that relies so extensively on computers and cyberspace can be made 100 percent invulnerable to attack. This is so because such systems employ many devices and operating systems of various origins and vintages, most incorporating numerous software updates and “patches” over time, offering multiple vectors for attack. Electronic components can also be modified by hostile actors during production, transit, or insertion; and the **whole system** itself is **dependent** to a **considerable degree** on the **electrical grid**, which itself is **vulnerable** to cyberattack and is far **less protected**. Experienced “**cyberwarriors**” of every major power have been working for years to probe for **weaknesses** in these systems and in many cases have devised cyberweapons, typically, malicious software (**malware**) and computer viruses, to exploit those weaknesses for military advantage.[5](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation#endnote05)

Although activity in cyberspace is much more difficult to detect and track than conventional military operations, enough information has become public to indicate that the major **nuclear powers**, notably China, Russia, and the United States, along with such secondary powers as Iran and North Korea, have established **extensive** cyberwarfare capabilities and engage in **offensive cyberoperations** on a **regular basis**, often aimed at **critical** military **infrastructure**. “Cyberspace is a contested environment where we are in constant contact with adversaries,” General Paul M. Nakasone, commander of the U.S. Cyber Command (Cybercom), told the Senate Armed Services Committee in February 2019. “We see near-peer competitors [China and Russia] conducting sustained campaigns below the level of armed conflict to erode American strength and gain strategic advantage.”

Although eager to speak of adversary threats to U.S. interests, Nakasone was noticeably but not surprisingly reluctant to say much about U.S. offensive operations in cyberspace. He acknowledged, however, that Cybercom took such action to disrupt possible Russian interference in the 2018 midterm elections. “We created a persistent presence in cyberspace to monitor adversary actions and crafted tools and tactics to frustrate their efforts,” he testified in February. According to press accounts, this included a cyberattack aimed at paralyzing the Internet Research Agency, a “troll farm” in St. Petersburg said to have been deeply involved in generating disruptive propaganda during the 2016 presidential elections.[6](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation#endnote06)

Other press investigations have disclosed two other offensive operations undertaken by the United States. One called “Olympic Games” was intended to disrupt Iran’s drive to increase its uranium-enrichment capacity by sabotaging the centrifuges used in the process by infecting them with the so-called Stuxnet virus. Another left of launch effort was intended to cause malfunctions in North Korean missile tests.[7](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation#endnote07) Although not aimed at either of the U.S. principal nuclear adversaries, those two attacks demonstrated a willingness and capacity to conduct cyberattacks on the nuclear infrastructure of other states.

Efforts by **strategic rivals of** the United States to **infiltrate** and eventually **degrade** U.S. **nuclear infrastructure** are far **less documented** but thought to be **no less prevalent**. Russia, for example, is believed to have planted **malware** in the U.S. electrical utility grid, possibly with the intent of **cutting off** the **flow** of **electricity** to critical **NC3 facilities** in the event of a major crisis.[8](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation#endnote08) Indeed, every major power, including the United States, is believed to have **crafted cyberweapons** aimed at critical **NC3 components** and to have implanted malware in enemy systems for potential use in some future confrontation.

Pathways to Escalation

Knowing that the NC3 systems of the major powers are constantly being probed for weaknesses and probably infested with malware designed to be activated in a crisis, what does this say about the risks of escalation from a nonkinetic battle, that is, one fought without traditional weaponry, to a kinetic one, at first using conventional weapons and then, potentially, nuclear ones? None of this can be predicted in advance, but those analysts who have studied the subject worry about the emergence of dangerous new pathways for escalation. Indeed, several such scenarios have been identified.[9](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation#endnote09)

The first and possibly most **dangerous path** to **escalation** would arise from the **early use** of **cyberweapons** in a great power **crisis** to ~~paralyze~~ **undermine** the vital command, control, and communications capabilities of an adversary, many of which serve nuclear and conventional forces. In the “**fog of war**” that would naturally ensue from such an encounter, the recipient of such an attack might fear more punishing follow-up kinetic attacks, possibly including the use of nuclear weapons, and, **fearing** the **loss** of its own **arsenal**, **launch** its weapons **immediately**. This might occur, for example, in a confrontation between NATO and Russian forces in east and central Europe or between U.S. and Chinese forces in the Asia-Pacific region.

Speaking of a possible confrontation in Europe, for example, James N. Miller Jr. and Richard Fontaine wrote that “both sides would have **overwhelming incentives** to go **early** with **offensive** cyber and counter-space **capabilities** to **negate** the other side’s military capabilities or **advantages**.” If these early attacks succeeded, “it could result in huge **military** and **coercive advantage** for the attacker.” This might induce the recipient of such attacks to back down, affording its rival a major victory at very low cost. Alternatively, however, the recipient might view the attacks on its critical command, control, and communications infrastructure as the **prelude** to a **full-scale attack** aimed at **neutralizing** its **nuclear capabilities** and choose to strike first. “It is worth considering,” Miller and Fontaine concluded, “how even a very limited attack or incident could set both sides on a slippery slope to rapid escalation.”[10](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation#endnote10)

What makes the insertion of **latent malware** in an adversary’s NC3 systems so **dangerous** is that it may not even **need** to be **activated** to **increase** the **risk** of **nuclear escalation**. If a nuclear-armed state comes to believe that its critical systems are infested with enemy malware, its leaders might **not trust** the information provided by its early-warning systems in a crisis and might **misconstrue** the **nature** of an **enemy attack**, leading them to **overreact** and possibly **launch** their **nuclear weapons** out of **fear** they are at **risk** of a **preemptive strike**.

“The **uncertainty** caused by the unique character of a cyber threat could **jeopardize** the **credibility** of the **nuclear deterrent** and **undermine strategic stability** in ways that advances in nuclear and conventional weapons do not,” Page O. Stoutland and Samantha Pitts-Kiefer wrote in 2018 paper for the Nuclear Threat Initiative. “[T]he introduction of a **flaw** or **malicious code** into nuclear weapons through the **supply chain** that **compromises** the **effectiveness** of those **weapons** could lead to a **lack** of **confidence** in the **nuclear deterrent**,” undermining strategic stability.[11](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation#endnote11) Without confidence in the reliability of its nuclear weapons infrastructure, a nuclear-armed state may misinterpret confusing signals from its early-warning systems and, fearing the worst, launch its own nuclear weapons rather than lose them to an enemy’s first strike. This makes the scenario proffered in the 2018 NPR report, of a nuclear response to an enemy cyberattack, that much more alarming.

**1AC — Plan**

**Plan: The United States federal judiciary should substantially increase prohibitions on private sector conduct that is more restrictive of competition than reasonably necessary to enable creation of information technology standards.**

**1AC — Solvency**

**Solvency —**

**The plan requires SSO’s to administer reasonable action to prohibit ex post opportunism---that strengthens FRAND effectiveness while enabling SEP holders to capture appropriate royalties---which is the best competition-innovation balance.**

**Melamed & Shapiro 18**, \*A. Douglas Melamed is Professor of the Practice of Law at Stanford Law School; \*Carl Shapiro is the Transamerica Professor of Business Strategy at the Haas School of Business at the University of California at Berkeley; (May 2018, “How Antitrust Law Can Make FRAND Commitments More Effective”, https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/How-Antitrust-Law-Can-Make-FRAND-Commitments-More-Effective.pdf)

3. Application of the Basic Legal Principles

The antitrust principle is **straightforward**: industry-wide collaboration through SSOs to establish procompetitive standards is **permitted** only if it is **no more restrictive** of competition than **reasonably necessary** to enable creation of the standards. When standard setting predictably creates technology **monopolies** that, if unrestrained, will enable **anticompetitive** ex post **opportunism** that would otherwise not occur, an SSO that **does not** take **effective** measures to prevent or minimize such ex post opportunism engages in conduct that is **more restrictive** of competition than necessary. In that case, the SSO and, in appropriate cases, its members, may well **violate Section 1** of the **Sherman Act**.

Under this principle, SSO procedures and FRAND rules should be **evaluated** based on whether they lead to **reasonable** SEP **royalties**, using the competitive ex ante licensing standard discussed above, which has been **adopted** by the courts in patent law. Put differently, FRAND rules should be evaluated based on their ability to prevent SEP holders from obtaining **more** than the **ex ante value** of their **technology** from implementers.

This limitation **would not** prevent a SEP holder from **proﬁting**, perhaps **greatly**, from participating in the SSO and having its patented technology included in the standard. The SEP holder **continues** to be **rewarded** for its technology because the inclusion of its technology in the standard can still **greatly increase** the volume of licensing opportunities available to the SEP holder.

Whether a particular set of FRAND rules are sufficiently effective in preventing ex post opportunism will depend on the particular circumstances. The procedural unfolding of the case will also depend upon the circumstances. As a general matter, the case would probably be structured as an ordinary **Rule of Reason** case.82

First, the plaintiff would have to demonstrate **harm** to **competition** as a result of the collaboration of the SSO’s members, many of which compete with one another. In this case, the harm to competition would stem from the ability of the SEP holder to exercise **monopoly** power by obtaining royalties in **excess** of the **competitive**, ex ante level. The decision to include patented technologies in the standard would be the allegedly **unlawful** agreement. Notably, the court **need not** determine what a FRAND royalty is; it would **suffice** to **determine** that **market power** has been **created** or **exercised**, and that existing SSO rules and policies were **not adequate** to prevent the competitive harm. The defendant, which could be the SSO or perhaps one or more SSO members, would win at this point if the plaintiff failed to show harm to competition. If might fail if the standard faces substantial competition and the court concludes that the SEP holder therefore does not have market power or if the SSO’s rules and policies are found to be effective in preventing ex post opportunism, even if the plaintiff or even the court thinks that other rules and policies would be preferable.

Second, if the plaintiff makes the requisite showing of harm to competition, the **defendant(s)** would then have to show some **procompetitive justiﬁcation**— in this case, the **beneﬁts** of the standard. These two initial steps should be straightforward.

Third, if as is likely the defendant is able to show a procompetitive justiﬁcation, the plaintiff would have to show that the SSO could have used available, reasonable **alternatives** to realize the **efficiency beneﬁts** with less or **none** of the competitive **harms**. The plaintiff might identify reasonable **alternatives** that would have led to a **different** standard, based on including **unpatented** technology in the standard or perhaps involving **fewer SEPs** or **fewer owners** of SEPs, which would be **less subject** to patent holdup. More likely, the plaintiff could suggest alternative SSO rules that would not change the standard, but would **reduce** the **likelihood** or extent of ex post **opportunism**. For example, the plaintiff might suggest more rigorous FRAND-type rules, such as rules that set forth more precise principles on which FRAND royalties are to be determined and the circumstances under which SEP holders might seek injunctions.

Fourth, the burden would then shift to the defendant(s) to show that the beneﬁts of the standard **could not** have been **realized** if the SSO had adopted any of the proffered **alternatives** or that those alternatives were unrealistic.83 The plaintiff would be entitled to judgment if the court concludes that those beneﬁts could have been realized with less competitive harm if the SSO had adopted the standard with different IPR rules or policies.

Our overall sense, based on experience and the empirical literature, is that the extant FRAND rules are generally useful, but tend to be **inadequate** because they are **imprecise** and leave **unresolved** such critical issues as (a) the meaning of a **reasonable** royalty, even conceptually; (b) the meaning of “**non-discriminatory**;” (c) to whom licenses must be offered; and (d) under what circumstances may a SEP holder obtain an injunction.84 These **imprecise** FRAND commitments are therefore **not sufficient** to adequately prevent ex post opportunism. The recent revisions to IEEE’s FRAND policy represent a signiﬁcant step in the right direction, but even this advance leaves important questions **unanswered**.85 If FRAND rules are inadequate in these ways, litigation involving extant FRAND rules would likely be resolved only at the ﬁnal, fourth step. The defendant would be able to **demonstrate** the **beneﬁts** created by the standard; the plaintiff would be able to demonstrate the **creation** of **market power** and that other reasonable and practical rules or policies would **ameliorate** the problem. The case would thus turn on whether the defendant is able to demonstrate that signiﬁcant beneﬁts associated with standardization could not have been realized if the SSO had adopted those other rules or policies.

The court would have **available** a **variety** of **possible remedies** if the plaintiff prevails. Implementers that paid supracompetitive royalties or were unlawfully excluded in whole or in part from product markets as a result of the inadequate FRAND policies would be **entitled** to **damages** and, in some cases, to **treble damages**.86 If the unlawful SSO conduct is regarded as the **collective action** of the SSO and its members, which is likely to be the case in most instances, SSO members would be **jointly** and **severally liable** for the damages. Forward-looking injunctive relief aimed at restoring competition would need to be fashioned to the requirements of the individual case. For example, a court could order the SSO to adopt a new rule or policy proposed by the plaintiff. If the court is reluctant to take on that governance role, it might give the SSO a period of time—maybe ninety days—to develop a rule, subject to the court’s ultimate approval, which would adequately ameliorate the competitive problem created by the SSO. Alternatively or in addition, the court might order the parties to attempt to **negotiate** a **rule** or policy on which they can agree. And, depending on the circumstances, the court might order SEP holders, including at least those that were defendants in the case, to comply with the new SSO rules and policies.

**Threatening antitrust liability lures SSO’s into adopting best practices.**

**Lemley & Shapiro 13**, \*Mark Lemley is the William H. Neukom Professor at Stanford Law School and a partner at Durie Tangri LLP; \*Carl Shapiro is the Transamerica Professor of Business Strategy at the Haas School of Business, University of California at Berkeley and a Senior Consultant at Charles River Associates; (2013, “A SIMPLE APPROACH TO SETTING REASONABLE ROYALTIES FOR STANDARD-ESSENTIAL PATENTS”, (https://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/frand.pdf)

Under our approach, many of these issues should become moot, since the patentee cannot obtain an injunction (or transfer the patent to someone who can) against a willing licensee, and since competitors are not involved in jointly setting the reasonable royalty rate. If SSOs set clear, reasonable rules following the best practices we recommend, and parties follow those rules, there should be **little** or **no need** for **antitrust** to **intervene**. Indeed, even the risk of non-disclosure of a patent is lessened, since the patentee has committed to license its essential patents whether or not it discloses them. For the most part, the rules we have described are **self-executing**, meaning that even if a party tries to break the rules set by the SSO there still may be no need for antitrust to intervene. Thus, we suggest that **parties** who **abide** by these **procedures**—patentees, implementers, and the SSOs themselves—should be **immune** from **antitrust liability** for activities that merely follow those rules.107 They have entered into an arrangement that is **on balance good** for **competition**, one that allows patentees to receive **reasonable royalties** but **prevents holdup** and **reduces** the risk of **monopolization** by **trickery**.

The fact that antitrust remains a last resort available when SSOs don’t follow best practices may have two practical benefits, however. First, under our approach the **promise** of **avoiding** the risk of **antitrust liability** will be a **powerful incentive** for both SSOs and patent owners to **adopt** the **best practices** we propose. Second, the risk of antitrust liability may be relevant when an individual patentee wants to adopt best practices but the SSO governing the standard has not yet done so. We propose that a patentee that unilaterally commits to the FRAND procedures we describe here should be immune from antitrust liability for following these procedures.108 A patentee’s unilateral binding commitment to arbitration could be enforced whether or not it was elicited by an SSO. Thus, just as the prospect of antitrust immunity might **lure SSOs** to **adopt best practices**, it might also lure **patentees** to **implement** those **practices** even if the SSO has not done so. Given the large number of standard-essential patents based on preexisting standards,109 and given that SSOs tend to update their IP rules rather slowly,110 this is **not** a **small matter**.

**Only antitrust enforcement creates a consumer-action feature that counterbalances SSO’s conspiratorial incentives---private action fails.**

**Melamed & Shapiro 18**, \*A. Douglas Melamed is Professor of the Practice of Law at Stanford Law School; \*Carl Shapiro is the Transamerica Professor of Business Strategy at the Haas School of Business at the University of California at Berkeley; (May 2018, “How Antitrust Law Can Make FRAND Commitments More Effective”, <https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/How-Antitrust-Law-Can-Make-FRAND-Commitments-More-Effective.pdf>)

2. Why Antitrust Enforcement Is Necessary

Some SSO members have an interest in ensuring that the SSO takes steps to minimize the potential harms from the SEP holders’ monopoly power, and this undoubtedly explains in part why most SSOs have adopted FRAND policies or similar requirements. But, as shown in the economic model in the Appendix,73 SSOs **cannot** in general **be counted on** to adopt effective FRAND policies. The bases for this conclusion, which is central to our argument for the applicability of Section 1 to SSO FRAND rules, can be summarized as follows.74

First, the SSO members **collectively have an interest** in permitting SEP holders to charge supracompetitive royalties that elevate the downstream price of compliant devices to the monopoly level. Doing so will enable the members **in aggregate** to collect **increased revenues** from consumers, and thus to generate **increased profits** that in theory could be **shared by all** the members. In other words, supracompetitive royalties can enrich industry participants as a group at the expense of final consumers. This fact alone should serve as a **clear and strong signal** regarding the **dangers** of counting on SSOs to implement effective FRAND policies: if the SSO members negotiate **efficiently**, the outcome will be **just as bad** for consumers as if the members agreed to **fix downstream prices**.75 The **fundamental problem** is that **final consumers** are **not at the table** when the SSO rules are negotiated.

Second, SSO members that own SEPs but earn little or no profits as implementers have a **powerful self-interest** in being able to exercise the ex post monopoly power associated with their SEPs. Because SSO policies are usually determined by a **consensus** process, these members will likely be able to **block the adoption** of **fully effective FRAND policies**. Moreover, these SSO members often have the greatest interest in SSO patent policies. Since much of their income may be attributable to patent licensing, they can be expected to devote substantial resources to block the adoption of FRAND policies that effectively prevent patent holdup.

Third, even SSO members that earn **significant profits** as implementers may have **mixed incentives** if they also own SEPs, which can also lead to **weak or in-effective FRAND rules**. In the Appendix, we show that, if the **requisite share** of votes in the SSO are cast by firms whose **share of SEP royalties** is at least as large as their share of **downstream profits**, and if these firms can coordinate their voting over the FRAND rules, then an SSO **unconstrained** by antitrust laws will establish FRAND rules leading to an outcome **no better for consumers** than would result from an **integrated monopolist** controlling all SEPs and all downstream sales.76

Fourth, even SSO members that are **downstream implementers** and own few, if any, SEPs may have only a **modest interest** in promoting effective policies to restrict ex post opportunism. Because all implementers will be subject to the opportunism, all of them will face **increased licensing costs**, and therefore will likely be able to **pass on** most or all of the **increased costs** to their customers.77 Furthermore, these implementers might not be **especially active** or **effective** in the standard-setting process for **free-riding** or **public-good** reasons, especially if SEP royalties constitute only a **relatively small portion** of the costs of their standard-implementing products. Public choice theory predicts that the highly motivated SEP holders are likely to have the **greatest influence** over **patent policies**.

Empirical evidence bears out these concerns. As a starting point, we find it striking that SSO FRAND rules are almost **always quite vague**.78 Notably, SSOs in which SEP holders are more prevalent tend to have weaker FRAND rules.79 Further, to our knowledge, SSOs have made almost **no effort** to enforce their FRAND rules and have, instead, **left enforcement** efforts to **others**.80 This evidence raises serious doubts about the effectiveness of the existing FRAND rules in preventing ex post opportunism.

#### Antitrust is critical---the broad standing and available remedies afforded are vastly superior to any other types of law.

Cary et al. 11, \*Messrs. George Cary and Alex Sistla are members of the California and District of Columbia Bars. Mr. Mark Nelson is a member of the New York and District of Columbia Bars. Mr. Steven Kaiser is a member of the New Jersey and District of Columbia Bars; (2011, “THE CASE FOR ANTITRUST LAW TO POLICE THE PATENT HOLDUP PROBLEM INSTANDARD SETTING”, <https://www.clearygottlieb.com/~/media/organize-archive/cgsh/files/publication-pdfs/the-case-for-antitrust-law-to-police-the-patent-holdup-problem-in-the-standard-setting.pdf>)

III. CONCLUSION

Patent holdup where a patentee has deceived an SSO in order to secure a position in the standard is, at its core, an antitrust problem. In this context, patent holders harm consumers by exploiting the competition-reducing aspects of standard setting to their own private advantage. In addition to being the body of law directed toward anticompetitive conduct, antitrust provides numerous practical advantages, including the possibility of governmental enforcement, and appropriately broad standing.

Remedying the patent holdup problem exclusively through non-antitrust legal remedies would be perverse. Indeed, it would be a bit like remedying patent infringement through the doctrine of common law conversion. In some instances, it might work, but there certainly would be under-enforcement.

To be sure, there are instances where deceptive conduct by the patentee does not harm competition and, in those instances, there is no antitrust claim. Often there will be patent remedies in that situation, or contract or even tort remedies. The legal regimes can and do coexist peacefully.

Those who argue that the marginal benefit of antitrust remedies do not out-weigh the cost of antitrust litigation both understate the benefits (broad standing and ready remedies where appropriate) and overstate the costs (the potential, however unknown, of “false positives,” i.e., condemning behavior that is not anticompetitive). In addition to being overstated, the false positives concern is also misplaced in this context. Unlike an antitrust attack on price cutting or a securities offering, the risk of a false positive here is not the over-deterrence of desired behavior, but rather that over-deterrence of deceptive and opportunistic behavior. Fretting about that form of over-deterrence seems itself to be a misallocation of resources. And preventing that form of over-deterrence by reliance on the competitive outcomes under legal regimes not designed to protect competition strikes us as unwise.

#### Ex ante valuations streamline innovation by weeding out the nonessentials and rewarding truly essential patents---increases court efficiency.

Arsego 15, \*David Arsego, J.D., Brooklyn Law School, May 2016, Certificate in Intellectual Property Law, B.S. in Mechanical Engineering, Villanova University, May 2010, works at Fay Kaplun & Marcin; (“The Problem with FRAND: How the Licensing Commitments of Standard-Setting Organizations Result in the Misvaluing of Patents”, <https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1416&context=bjil>)

A common theme in current FRAND litigation is inflated claims for damages and desired royalty rates. Judge Holderman in In re Innovatio IP Ventures reduced IP Ventures’ award to a few percentage points of its original claim. He justified this action by stressing the importance of the patent to the standard at issue and ruled that patents of lesser importance are not entitled to as high of rates as patents of greater importance. This proposed valuation framework intends to assess that very same importance, ex ante and prior to any negotiations or litigation. The intent is for contracting parties to have an initial understanding of the patent value prior to negotiations. In the same way that Judge Holderman’s judgement turned on the classification of the at-issue patents as “of moderate to moderate-high importance to the standard”, an opinion from ETSI that assesses this same importance would give negotiation parties a relatively clear picture of the importance of their patents.

D. The Effects of Such Valuation

The intended effect of this mandatory patent valuation is not to solve every patent-licensing disagreement that parties will have. It is merely a proposed tool that will help companies come to an agreement more efficiently. Both parties will be aware if one party has a portfolio full of patents with little importance and will not waste time debating the value. Similarly, if two parties are in litigation regarding whether or not a royalty rate is FRAND, the judge will not have to perform an independent analysis of the patent’s importance herself, but can instead rely on ETSI’s determination. The effect of this reliance, and the initial determination of essentiality, will be far reaching. Duplicitous patent holders that may claim essentiality for meritless patents will now be barred from asserting SEP rights.246 Important innovators with valuable patents will be more justly rewarded for their innovation, not only by having an “important” label on their SEPs, but by no longer competing for royalties with patents that are deemed to be nonessential.

#### Ex ante disclosure solves lock-in, improves transparency and openness.

Contreras 13, \*Jorge L. Contreras is a Presidential Scholar and Professor of Law at the University of Utah with an adjunct appointment in the Department of Human Genetics. He is a graduate of Harvard Law School (JD) and Rice University (BSEE, BA); (Contreras, J. L. (2013). TECHNICAL STANDARDS AND EX ANTE DISCLOSURE: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS OF AN EMPIRICAL STUDY. Jurimetrics, 53(2), 163-211. Retrieved from https://www2.lib.ku.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/technical-standards-ex-ante-disclosure-results/docview/1428261870/se-2?accountid=14556)

Ex ante disclosure of licensing terms could potentially alleviate the causes of such disputes by making a patent holder's royalty rate known before lock-in of a standard. Thus, if maximum royalty rates were known in advance, it would be more difficult for an implementer to argue that such rates were unreasonable (as the SDO could have chosen an alternative technology if this were the case).148 Lacking this potential defense against an infringement claim by the patent holder, implementers might be more inclined to negotiate with patent holders before the adoption of a standard. By the same token, if a patent holder knew that its maximum royalty rate would be scrutinized before the approval of a standard, and that SDO participants would be free to consider alternative, less costly technologies, it would have an incentive to disclose a royalty rate that was as reasonable (or low) as possible.149

Ex ante disclosure of licensing terms has an intuitive appeal. Like the prices of menu items at a restaurant, it has been argued that the royalty rates for standards-essential patents should be disclosed before product vendors (diners) are locked into costly technology choices. But critics of ex ante disclosure have argued that requiring early disclosure of licensing terms will impede standards-development processes and create additional legal risks for participants. To assess the validity of these complaints, we studied ex ante licensing disclosures at VITA, IEEE and IETF and found no evidence that such policies resulted in measurable negative effects on the number of standards started or adopted, personal time commitments or quality of standards, nor was there compelling evidence that ex ante policies caused the lengthening of time required for standardization or the depression of royalty rates. There was evidence to suggest that the adoption of ex ante policies may have contributed to positive effects observed on some of these variables. In addition, a significant majority of participants in VITA, the only SDO adopting a mandatory ex ante policy, felt that the information elicited by the organization's ex ante policy improved the overall openness and transparency of the standards-development process. Thus, while there are numerous areas in which further study and analysis may be warranted, and other organizations in which the implementation of ex ante policies may have different effects, we concluded that the process-based criticisms of ex ante policies and the predicted negative effects flowing from the adoption of such policies are not supported by the available evidence.

# 2AC

## Adv — Innovation

#### 1---there’s no impact to winning this argument.

Cotter et al. 19, \*Thomas F. Cotter, Briggs and Morgan Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School; Innovators Network Foundation Intellectual Property Fellow; \*Erik Hovenkamp, Assistant Professor, USC Gould School of Law; \*Norman Siebrasse, Professor of Law, University of New Brunswick Faculty of Law; (2019, “Demystifying Patent Holdup”, https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4667&context=wlulr)

B. Patent Holdup Is Not a Problem, Because It Is Not Systemic

A second, related argument is that there is no empirical evidence of patent owners engaging in pervasive, systemic patent holdup in the very industries holdup theorists are most concerned with (e.g., telecommunications).139 Indeed, according to the critics, if holdup were pervasive one would expect innovation and growth in the affected industries to “stagnate, wither, or die,”140 whereas if one looks “across human history, it is not clear that the commercialization of complex technologies has ever been faster than it is today in those industries that reform proponents point to as most plagued by the patent holdup ‘problem.’”141

Although we agree that whether, or to what extent, patent holdup occurs in the real world is ultimately an empirical matter, the implication that patent holdup is a problem only if it is “pervasive” or “systemic” is a non sequitur.142 If our analysis above is correct—that the ability to engage in patent holdup depends on path dependence, that settings conducive to patent holdup are not uncommon, and that the three components of a holdup royalty can exist independently of one another—patent holdup does not have to be systemic to be capable of reducing social welfare. Seeing how the empirical critiques of patent holdup do “not claim[ ] that individual firms never attempt to engage in behavior that can be characterized as holdup,”143 the conclusion that holdup is not systemic may well be accurate, for all we know, while still being of any limited relevance for purposes of determining whether injunctive relief should issue on the facts of any one particular case.144 If the choice were between always granting an injunction without tailoring or conditions, and never granting any form of injunctive relief, perhaps the question of whether holdup was systemic, at least in a particular industry, would be central. But the traditional approach to injunctive relief looks to the facts of the particular case.145

#### Don’t trust authors from GMU’s Mercatus Institute (or Global Antitrust Institute).

McLaughlin 21, Bloomberg, (David, March 12th, 2021, “One Tech-Funded University Helped Shape FTC’s Hands-Off Approach”, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-03-12/how-george-mason-university-shaped-ftc-s-hands-off-approach-to-tech>)

* Alden Abbott, Jonathan Barnett are both fellows at George Mason University’s Center for Intellectual Property and Innovation Policy (funded by Qualcomm)
* Joshua Wright is a former FTC commissioner who taught at the institute and lobbied for Qualcomm

The [Tech Transparency Project](https://www.techtransparencyproject.org/) (TTP), a watchdog group in Washington, details in a new report an unusually close relationship between the law school at Virginia’s George Mason University and the Federal Trade Commission. By helping shape the workforce of the FTC, the group claims, the school infused it with a laissez-faire philosophy favorable to the school’s tech donors.

[The report](https://www.techtransparencyproject.org/articles/big-techs-backdoor-ftc) throws a harsh light on the FTC’s hands-off approach to tech companies over the past decade. As the agency prepares to argue the lawsuit against [Facebook Inc.](https://www.bloomberg.com/quote/FB:US) that it filed late last year, seeking to break up the social media giant, it must contend with an inconvenient fact: It approved Facebook’s acquisitions of Instagram in 2012 and WhatsApp in 2014—the very mergers it now seeks to undo. The FTC’s consent to those deals is cited by critics as evidence of a permissive attitude that allowed tech companies to grow into leviathans.

One explanation for its lenience, the TTP report charges, is that the industry used a corner of academia to capture the agency. According to the report, which was published on March 12, Silicon Valley donated substantial sums to George Mason’s Antonin Scalia Law School, which built a pipeline of professors and graduates who went to work at the FTC. Dozens of people went from the school to the regulator—commissioners, bureau heads, attorney-advisers, legal interns—during the Obama and Trump administrations.

Under President Trump alone, professors and graduates of Scalia Law, and heads of affiliated programs at George Mason, served as the FTC chair, general counsel, policy planning head, and leaders of its three main divisions: the bureaus of competition, consumer protection, and economics.

Katie Paul, who heads the TTP, says an investigation is needed into “whether George Mason University has effectively become Big Tech’s back door into the FTC, giving the companies an undisclosed way to sway its decision-making and hobble enforcement action.”

Revolving Door

Large tech companies have donated to two programs affiliated with Scalia Law, the Global Antitrust Institute and the Law & Economics Center. From January 2018 to the end of last year, [Google](https://www.bloomberg.com/quote/GOOGL:US) donated $900,000, [Amazon.com Inc.](https://www.bloomberg.com/quote/AMZN:US) contributed $925,000, and Facebook Inc. gave $675,000, according to documents obtained by Bloomberg Businessweek through a public records request. Google, Amazon, and Facebook declined to comment on their donations.

The law school says the ties between its faculty and the FTC aren’t unusual. Alison Price, a senior associate dean, says it’s common for professors to work for federal agencies and then return to their teaching jobs. “Since Scalia Law has special expertise and a relatively large faculty in antitrust, it’s logical that our faculty is called to serve with frequency,” she says. “But faculty don’t set policy; administrations do.”

The Tech Transparency Project is part of a larger watchdog group, [Campaign for Accountability](https://campaignforaccountability.org/). The TTP website cites several philanthropists as donors, including George Soros’s Open Society Foundations. Oracle Corp. had been a donor to a TTP predecessor group that focused mostly on Google, but the TTP says it no longer accepts corporate funding.

Both George Mason programs, which host conferences and offer training for judges and antitrust enforcers, promote the consumer-welfare standard articulated by Robert Bork, the late federal judge and Yale Law School professor. That standard, the guidepost for regulators and courts since the 1980s, looks to price increases as a gauge of competitive harm. It is blamed by some antitrust experts for handcuffing enforcers when it comes to policing tech companies.

The tech companies’ donations are drawing scrutiny. At a hearing on Feb. 25, New York Democratic Representative Mondaire Jones called Abbott “Tad” Lipsky, a former FTC official now at the [Global Antitrust Institute](https://gai.gmu.edu/), “a wolf in sheep’s clothing.” As he testified against proposals to give the antitrust laws more teeth, Lipsky drew Jones’s scorn. Programs such as the GAI “have worked to teach judges and regulators to let their guard down as corporate funders like yours came to dominate our economy,” Jones said. Lipsky responded that his antitrust views predated “any of these digital technology companies.”

A key figure in the law school-to-regulator pipeline is Lipsky’s boss, Joshua Wright, an FTC commissioner from 2013 to 2015. He now teaches antitrust law at George Mason while also running the GAI.

Wright wielded outsize influence at the agency, pushing through a 2015 policy statement in an attempt to rein in the agency’s enforcement power. After he left he improperly lobbied the agency on behalf of Qualcomm Inc., one of the law school’s largest donors, according to a report by the FTC inspector general that was obtained by TTP and verified by Bloomberg Businessweek. His name was redacted in the report, but Wright confirmed it was about him. He says he did nothing wrong.

The New York Times last year [reported that tech companies bankrolled the work of the GAI](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/24/technology/global-antitrust-institute-google-amazon-qualcomm.html) and that Wright had worked with corporate donors to fend off critics. The extent of the revolving door between the FTC and the law school, and Wright’s alleged violation of ethics laws, haven’t been previously reported.

Many companies support higher education, and many universities send professors and graduates to Washington. But George Mason is unique in cultivating a specific regulator, says Jeff Hauser, executive director of the [Revolving Door Project](https://therevolvingdoorproject.org/), which tracks government officials’ corporate ties.

“In terms of feeding directly into a government agency, I’m not aware of any equivalent at the SEC or the EPA or anything else,” he says, referring to the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Environmental Protection Agency.

A public university in the northern Virginia suburbs of Washington, George Mason is home to the free-market think tank the [Mercatus Center](https://www.mercatus.org/" \t "_blank" \o "Mercatus Center website). It is a leader in the study of applying economic analysis to the law, emphasizing that markets work best when government regulates less. The university became known as a haven for conservatives at the end of the Reagan administration in 1988. Even Bork taught there after stepping down from the bench in 1988.

The George Mason conduit was steady and robust, according to the TTP, which details dozens of examples of people moving between the FTC and the law school over the past decade. One is James Cooper, who directs an economics and privacy program at the Law & Economics Center. He simultaneously taught at the school and served as a deputy director for the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection.

Cooper was among the academics who urged House lawmakers last year to reject proposals to break up tech companies and make merger approvals more difficult. George Mason’s Wright, Lipsky, and John Yun, a professor at the law school who was an economist at the FTC, joined the filing. Cooper didn’t respond to a request for comment, and Yun declined to comment.

But Wright, the former FTC commissioner, perhaps best embodies the ties linking the FTC to the law school and its donors. After leaving the agency in 2015, Wright simultaneously taught at George Mason, ran the GAI, and worked for the Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati law firm, where he represented Qualcomm.

The FTC sued Qualcomm in January 2017 in a monopoly case that was developed while Wright was an FTC commissioner. Wright tried to broker a settlement about four months after the case was brought. He met Lipsky, then the acting director of the FTC’s competition bureau, for lunch at a steakhouse in Washington and tried to set up an additional meeting with agency officials, according to the inspector general’s report.

In doing so, Wright violated an ethics law that bans officials for life from lobbying on issues they worked on “personally and substantially,” according to the inspector general. Those findings were referred to the Department of Justice’s public integrity section. The Justice Department, which decided not to prosecute, declined to comment.

Lipsky resigned two months after his lunch with Wright, who then hired him at the GAI. Lipsky didn’t respond to a request for comment.

“I never made any appearance at the FTC involving its enforcement action against Qualcomm or discussed the merits of the case with any FTC official,” says Wright, who declined to elaborate on the specifics of the investigation. “I immediately complied when the FTC ethics office informed me that I should not make any appearance based upon a single preliminary vote I had cast years before the case was filed.”

Qualcomm contributed almost $5.8 million to the George Mason law school programs from 2016 through 2020. Less than two months before Wright met with the FTC to try to settle the Qualcomm case, the company gave $525,000 to the GAI. The company didn’t respond to requests for comment.

Tech companies that donate to George Mason collaborate with the school’s professors on projects, according to emails obtained through a public records request.

## Adv — Cyber

#### Critical infrastructure is interdependent---individual failures cascade.

Manheim 20, Lead Researcher at 1Day Sooner Inc., Former Contract Researcher at the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford University, “The Fragile World Hypothesis: Complexity, Fragility, and Systemic Existential Risk,” Futures, Volume 122, 09/01/2020, p. 102570

3. Fragility and Systemic Risk

As **tech**nologies develop, they often **build on** one another, so that the continued operation of the **system** depends on a growing set of **other s**ystems. The way that failure occurs and **propagates** in such systems is **non-obvious**, but it is largely dependent on the **topology of** the **interdependence** between components. Pastor-Satorras, Castellano, Van Mieghem, and Vespignani (2015) **Simple** dependencies, where a system **requires** the functioning of every component, can make the resulting **system of systems** **more fragile** than the components. A very basic model of this shows that given a system-of-systems with N components, each of which independently can fail at the rate Fi the failure rate is Text

Description automatically generated. While this grows more slowly than the sum of the individual failure rates as new systems are added, it is also far higher than the average failure rate of those individual systems.

As a concrete **example**, the peak of **efficient farming** once required **family farms** to depend on a **family** to manage the farm, a **blacksmith** to make horseshoes and plows, and draft **animals** to pull them. Losing any one of these would be enough to (eventually) make the system unable to continue, and there was some risk that this would occur. Still, the limited number of inputs and the substitutability of other inputs made such systems fairly **stable** - especially because many risks were **uncorrelated** across farms, and could often be addressed by borrowing from other farms nearby.

The farms of today, of course, are **not nearly** as simple. They require everything from **satellite GPS** systems to pinpoint locations, to the **semiconductors** and fabrication plants used to make specific **integrated chips** used in the farm equipment, to **internet** connectivity to run **machine learning** algorithms using collected data and satellite imagery on remote servers. Zubarev, Fomin, and Zubarev (2019) Modern agribusiness depends on everything from finding and hiring **skilled laborers** to manage complex machinery, to managing regulatory, financial, and other factors critical to farm operation. Kingwell (2011) These are often more **tightly correlated** across an economy, **increasing** risk. Beyond that, managing these farms requires understanding “human, technical, economic, financial, risk, institutional and social” issues, as Lewis et al. noted more than a decade ago. Lewis, Malcolm, and Steed (2006)

The risk is likely not yet **critical**, but it seems clear that **dependence is growing**, and the ability to use **backup** system**s** can be **lost**. For example, if remote servers become unavailable, local corn farms may lack the information needed to decide where to increase and decrease watering levels, or even lose the ability to run their computer-controlled irrigation systems. Similarly, decades ago supplies and ordering were managed on paper, and now, without the servers running Software-as-a-Service supply-chain-management software, the dairy farm down the road may not have access to an inventory of their supplies or know what amounts of products are needed or what they have historically ordered, and end up unable to feed their cows.

The inter-dependencies in such systems are more complex than the above model allows, but more complex analyses, such as those employing percolation analysis to understand mutual interdependency of multiple networks, Buldyrev, Parshani, Gerald Paul, Stanley, and Havlin (2010) show the same trend. That is, **interdependent** systems where failures can **propagate** can be **far more likely** to **fail** than the average rate at which the individual systems’ components fail. Worse, analysis of “high–value, technology– and engineering–intensive products or systems…used to produce consumer goods and services” has shown that the failure rates are nearly-additive, and worse, are hard to identify. Yeo and Ren (2009)

It should be noted that modern computer networks do not display such fragility, but this is a function of intentional design. Metcalfe and Boggs (1976) Simple network structures, such as lines or rings, are far more prone to failure Clark, Pogran, and Reed (1978). That is, unless a system was designed for resilience, resilience should not be expected. And when technological systems are made efficient and complex, they tend to be tightly coupled - meaning that failure in one place spreads Bookstaber (2007).

3.1. Inevitable Technological Fragility Hypothesis

The proposal of this paper, to provide an addendum to Bostrom's hypothesis, is that if technological development continues indefinitely, **systemic fragility** will increase to the point that the possibility of a **shock** sufficient for **complete collapse** approaches certainty.

This hypothesis rests on a number of assumptions, but there are also a variety of reasons to find it plausible and concerning. To lay these out clearly, we will first consider the question of how and why individual systems are fragile, then make an argument that it is at least plausible that the multiple interconnected systems and systems-of-systems which are necessary for much of modern civilization not only fail to address this risk, but multiply it.

4. Single-System Complexity and Fragility

The key question so far is whether fragility increases over time as systems are built. The answer to that question depends on a combination of factors that can push in either direction. These include increasing complexity of systems, the economic incentives for efficiency over robustness and the resulting levels of investment in resilience, the failure rates of individual components and systems, as well as the way in which systems-of-systems (and systems-of-systems-of-systems) are interrelated, and the extent to which systems and their interdependencies are designed to be robust.

Even the claim of inevitable fragility in individual systems makes several assumptions about how fragility increases. Before looking at the systemic question of how fragility could lead to collapse, we will outline these assumptions. Note that these are in fact assumptions, rather than claims - if any one of them is false in ways that are outlined, it would refute the hypothesis. The third assumption is particularly critical, and will be explored further in the next subsection.

First, for fragility to matter, the current trend of efficiency-increasing and resilience-decreasing technologies must continue to apply to at least one critical system, such as agriculture, communication, or transport. If this is wrong, and future white-ball / safe exploration technologies are ones that favor robustness over efficiency in all such critical domains, the trend would reverse. For instance, distributed fault tolerant computing arguably increases both efficiency and robustness. Most new technologies move in the opposite direction, but if enough resilience increasing technology is found, the balance could shift.

Second, the argument for increasing fragility assumes that economic growth continues to absorb human effort in a way that does not lead to overabundant resources. In Eric Drexler's ’Paretotopia‘ scenario, increased resources are unmatched by increased demand. Drexler (2019) In that future case, resources are abundant enough that robustness is easy to achieve. This second scenario also assumes the absence of supercharged competition that uses the newly abundant resources. This would not occur, for example, in Hanson's proposed default “Em” scenario, where human-based intelligences are simulated computationally, leading to a reduction rather than an increase in surplus that could be redirected to robustness for lack of other needs. Hanson (2016)

Third, it assumes that fragility is relatively hard to identify, such that at least some failures will be unanticipated. This has been true historically, but it is possible that future developments would reverse this trend, making the search for increased robustness itself efficient enough to counterbalance the more general and destabilizing increased fragility that new technology allows. If failures do become easy to anticipate, more expensive general resilience can be replaced with more specific redundancies targeted to the exact failure modes identified.

4.1. Non-Obvious Fragility

As mentioned, hard-to-identify fragility is a key assumption. Broadly speaking, non-obvious fragility is the result of planning for efficiency, instead of designing for redundancy, fault tolerance, or even provable safety. This is a fairly general fact about any control system. Paattilammi and Makila (2000) The concrete result of the current optimization shows clear signs of producing fragile results. One example is the proliferation of disposable technology, such as fragile smartphones designed to be replaced rather than fixed or upgraded. Failure of these optimized devices is normal, and while mitigating failure is important, it is often the case that risk must be accepted, rather than avoided. Perrow (2011) This type of fragility is obvious and anticipated, rather than non-obvious and worrying. For example, individual computers are fragile, and components fail frequently. For this reason, in high-reliability computer systems, a variety of mechanisms are in place to compensate, including redundant online systems for data storage, Chen, Lee, Gibson, Katz, and Patterson (1994) or methods to address other hardware failures. Wang, Zhang, and Xu (2017)

The fact that computer networks are not fragile, and the fragility that does exist is well understood, seems to be a counterexample. But the resilience itself is planned, in contrast to ecological systems where it is emergent - as we will discuss in detail below. This means that fault-tolerant designs are built to be tolerant of expected faults. Not only that, but resilience itself is optimized, for example, to minimize the number of backups or other costs needed to have a planned level of reliability. Rodrigues-da Silva and Crispim (2014) This creates fragility to unexpected faults, and allows the systems to operate through anticipated contingencies, but not to anything beyond that point.

4.2. Sociotechnical Resilience

Fragility of systems is not based purely on the lack of resilience of technical systems. In fact, fragility of optimized technical systems is compensated for by the greater robustness of sociological systems. The combined sociotechnical system, then, is the level at which fragility should be considered.

To reduce the fragility of sociotechnical systems, organizations can attempt to build more resilience at the organizational level. This can involve information sharing, distributed decision making, and better risk assessment. If done well, these attempts provide a sociotechnical system that compensates for technical and operation risk, but is again very different from emergent resilience. Langeland, Manheim, Mcleod, and Nacouzi (2016) Unfortunately, the interaction between humans and technology can often multiply risks, rather than mitigate them. Yeo and Ren (2009)

Another reason to think that sociotechnical resilience will not fully compensate for technological fragility is the reduced human involvement in technical systems. As automation increases, Danzig notes that humans are increasingly necessarily out-of-the-loop. Danzig (2018) He further argues that when there is competition, this dynamic is a necessary result of continued optimization.

To conclude the discussion of single-system fragility, we note that inevitable fragility of systems is not actually required for the hypothesis presented. As this section argued, it does seem plausible that in expectation, new technologies will be more fragile than those they replace. However, systemic risk can exist given the much weaker claim that specific critical systems are relied upon, and technological improvements relevant to those systems alone exhibit sufficient **fragility** to cause a **cascading collapse**. Before discussing the interaction between systems, however, it is worth considering how these human, technical, or sociotechnical systems differ from naturally resilient biological systems.

## T — Per Se

#### We meet---the plan still increases prohibitions on anticompetitive conduct, the rule of reason is simply a test that decides whether certain conduct actually violates said prohibition.

Fishman 19, \*Todd Fishman, [Allen & Overy LLP](https://www.jdsupra.com/profile/Allen_Overy_docs/); (January 31st, 2019, “The Rule of Reason as a Bar to Criminal Antitrust Enforcement”, https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-rule-of-reason-as-a-bar-to-criminal-87406/)

Antitrust law’s rule of reason was born of technical necessity. By its terms, §1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “[e] very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade.” 15 U.S.C. §1. Despite the expansive language of the statutory prohibition, the Supreme Court has held that §1 prohibits only agreements that unreasonably restrain trade. *Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States*, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); *Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States*, 221 U.S. 1, 58-60 (1911). With the rule of reason, antitrust courts assumed a prudential role in administering the scope of antitrust violations, applying a factual inquiry weighing legitimate justifications for a restraint against any anticompetitive effects. Under the rule of reason, “the factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition.” *Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania,* 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977).

#### Counter-interpretation---rule of reason is a prohibition.

Light 19, Sarah E. Light Assistant Professor of Legal Studies and Business Ethics, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania., The Law of the Corporation as Environmental Law, 71 Stan. L. Rev. 137, 2019, Lexis/Nexis

While antitrust law can serve as an environmental mandate by prohibiting collusive behavior that keeps environmentally preferable goods from the market, there is also conflict between antitrust law's goals of promoting competition and environmental law's goals of promoting [\*177] conservation. 192 Because antitrust law's per se rule and rule of reason operate on a somewhat fluid continuum, 193 this Subpart discusses the two doctrines together. The per se rule operates as a prohibition, whereas the rule of reason operates as both a prohibition and a disincentive. As noted above, antitrust law generally prohibits certain types of market activity - price fixing, horizontal boycotts, and output limitations - as illegal per se, and harm to competition is presumed. 194 For example, if an industry association declines to award a seal of approval necessary for a product's sale without any good faith attempt to test the product's performance, but rather simply because that product is manufactured by a competitor, such an action would be illegal per se. 195 Under this Article's framework, a per se violation is thus a prohibition. The more fact-intensive inquiry under the rule of reason tests "whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition." 196 While this extremely broad statement might suggest that any fact is relevant to the inquiry, the salient facts under the rule of reason are "those that tend to establish whether a restraint increases or decreases output, or decreases or increases prices." 197 If an anticompetitive effect is found, then the action is illegal and the rule of reason operates, like the per se rule, as a prohibition. 198 The rule of reason can also operate as a disincentive, even if no [\*178] court finds an anticompetitive effect, as uncertainty and litigation risk may discourage firms from undertaking legally permissible, environmentally positive industry collaborations. 199 Associations of firms have adopted numerous mechanisms of private environmental governance to address the management of common pool resources like fisheries, forests, and the global climate. 200 Examples include the Sustainable Apparel Coalition's Higg Index 201 and the American Chemistry Council's Responsible Care program. 202 But private industry standards raise special antitrust concerns. An agreement among competitors with respect to product or process specifications may exclude competitors who fail to meet such standards, raising the specter that such industry collaborations really constitute output limitations or efforts to limit competition. 203 While the U.S. Supreme Court has scrutinized private standard-setting associations carefully, 204 it has noted that if associations "promulgate … standards based on the merits of objective expert judgments and through procedures that prevent the standard-setting process from being biased by members with economic interests in stifling product competition … , those private standards can have significant procompetitive advantages." 205 In the absence of price fixing or a boycott, a rule of reason analysis generally applies to product standard setting by private associations. 206 The uncertain outcome [\*179] inherent in the application of antitrust law in this context could therefore serve as a potential disincentive to the adoption of private industry standards. 207 The challenge of course is that some form of explicit sanctions on noncompliant industry members may be necessary for private industry standards to be effective. In the context of private reputational mechanisms like the New York Diamond Dealers Club, 208 Barak Richman has pointed out that the Club's use of reputational sanctions and voluntary refusals to deal with actors who flout industry norms, while welfare enhancing, could nonetheless amount to violations of antitrust law. 209 This echoes the concern raised by Andrew King and Michael Lenox in their extensive empirical analysis of the Responsible Care program created by the Chemical Manufacturers Association (now the American Chemistry Council). 210 King and Lenox concluded that the absence of explicit sanctions on members who failed to meet the standards set by the program left the program vulnerable to "opportunism." 211 While they suggested that industry associations could look to third parties to enforce the rules, 212 an alternative way to facilitate the long-term environmental benefits of stronger sanctions would be to interpret antitrust law in conformity with the environmental priority principle presented below. 213 [\*180] In some instances, the conflict between the values of promoting competition and conserving environmental resources can be stark. 214 Jonathan Adler, for example, has identified this conflict in the context of fisheries - a tragedy of the commons situation in which some form of collective action is required to avoid overfishing. 215 He cites as an example Manaka v. Monterey Sardine Industries, Inc., in which a fisherman was excluded from a local fishing cooperative. 216 The fisherman sued the cooperative under the Sherman Act, and the court found an antitrust violation in his exclusion. 217 While the fishing cooperative's policies were no doubt exclusionary, Adler contends that they also promoted conservation by restricting catch. 218 The fishery collapsed by the 1950s, a collapse Adler hypothesizes might have been "inevitable" but that perhaps might not have occurred in the absence of the antitrust suit. 219 While a court performing a rule of reason analysis must consider whether a restraint on trade suppresses or destroys competition, Adler points out that courts may also "consider offsetting efficiencies from otherwise anticompetitive arrangements." 220 It is not clear, however, that the courts have consistently taken these factors into account. 221 Among other potential remedies, Adler argues that to resolve this tension between antitrust law, on the one hand, and private collective action to conserve environmental resources, on the other, courts should more actively consider the "ancillary conservation benefits of otherwise anticompetitive conduct." 222 Recognizing the long-term health of a fishery would be consistent with antitrust law's purpose of ensuring viable markets exist in the future, and consistent with the environmental priority principle introduced below. 223

#### Prohibit can mean ‘severely hinder’---doesn’t necessitate a ban.

Washington Court of Appeals 19 (KORSMO-judge. Opinion in State v. Kimball, No. 35441-5-III (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 2, 2019). Google scholar caselaw. Date accessed 7/13/21).

His argument runs counter to the meaning of the word "prohibit." It means "1. To forbid by law. 2. To prevent, preclude, or severely hinder." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1405 (10th ed. 2014). As "severely hinder" suggests, a "prohibition" need not be an all or nothing proposition.

#### The ‘per se’ distinction is meaningless---rules always devolve into standards.

Crane 7 Daniel A. Crane is Assistant Professor, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 49 (2007), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol64/iss1/3

Before proceeding much further, it is worth pausing to consider the possibility that a world of antitrust rules would be illusory because, in practice, rules always fade into standards. Take H.L.A. Hart's observation that "[n]atural languages like English are... irreducibly open-textured" when specifying "general classifying terms,' ' 0 0 or Wittgenstein's point that the problem with rules is that they do not tell you when they should be applied.' 0 ' Because language is irreducibly open-textured and indeterminate and because rules lack internal mechanisms to specify when they should be applied, even when the law is formally framed as a rule, it requires penumbral rules, canons of interpretation, and other secondary decisional criteria which end up swallowing the apparent simplicity of the rule. 10 2 Specifying the governing law as a simple, bright-line rule may merely conceal the fact that important balancing of social interests, weighing of probabilities, and choosing between competing ends and means lurk in the shadow of the rule. Declaring a legal rule thus appears misleading or even dishonest because it hides the social preferences that animate the decision-maker's conclusion. Under one interpretation, antitrust law provides the perfect illustration for Hart and Wittgenstein's point. In this view, there never have been such things as case-determinative antitrust rules-only standards clad in rule-bound rhetoric. The current march toward standards, then, is not so much a change in liability determinants as a dissipation of the mystery surrounding antitrust's concealed methodology. In a moment, I will dispute this possibility and argue that the specification of antitrust law as rule or standard has very important practical consequences. But first, it is worth acknowledging the extent to which Hart and Wittgenstein's observation rings true in antitrust. A case in point is antitrust law's long-standing per se prohibition against "price fixing." As any antitrust practitioner will recognize, price fixing appears in quotation marks because application of the per se rule depends not on the fact that competitors have literally fixed prices but that the challenged conduct falls within the antitrust category known as "price fixing." The judicial decision often thought to have established the per se rule against price-fixing did not involve price fixing either literally or figuratively but rather a gentleman's agreement by dominant oil producers to buy up distressed oil from small refineries and thereby stabilize the wholesale market. 1 03 The defendants never came close to agreeing on price. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held that any "combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce" amounts to "price fixing" in the relevant legal sense, whether or not the defendants have actually done the act that a lay person might suppose "price fixing" to be-fixing a price. 1 On the other hand, the Supreme Court has described an act of apparent price fixing by competitors-an agreement on prices for blanket licensing of musical repertoires-as something other than "price fixing" and hence subject to the rule of reason. 0 5 In BMI v. CBS, the Supreme Court rejected textual "literalism" and held that application of the per se rule against price fixing is not as "simplistic" as "determining whether two or more potential competitors have literally 'fixed' a 'price.'" 06 Rather, "[a] s generally used in the antitrust field, 'price fixing' is a shorthand way of describing certain categories of business behavior to which the per se rule has been held applicable."' 0 7 Application of the per se rule turns not on whether the conduct amounts literally to price fixing but on whether the "particular practice is one of those types or that it is 'plainly anticompetitive' and very likely without 'redeeming virtue."" 8 This flexibility in the per se rule invites endless pages of briefing on whether the conduct at issue should be properly characterized as "price fixing" because it unjustifiably tampers with the market mechanism for determining prices or as something else because it can be justified by efficiencies, a standard-favoring way of doing law.'0 9 Hence, Hart explains that rules inevitably dissolve into standards and Wittgentsein explains that rules do not tell us when to apply them.

## CP — Patent Law

#### A---consumer-action deficit. Patent infringers have attenuated incentives to cough up high royalties because SSO’s can profit in aggregate by passing costs onto consumers---that’s Melamed and Shapiro. That means widening the plaintiff pool beyond implementers is key---which the counterplan CANNOT do.

Cary et al. 11, \*Messrs. George Cary and Alex Sistla are members of the California and District of Columbia Bars. Mr. Mark Nelson is a member of the New York and District of Columbia Bars. Mr. Steven Kaiser is a member of the New Jersey and District of Columbia Bars; (2011, “THE CASE FOR ANTITRUST LAW TO POLICE THE PATENT HOLDUP PROBLEM INSTANDARD SETTING”, <https://www.clearygottlieb.com/~/media/organize-archive/cgsh/files/publication-pdfs/the-case-for-antitrust-law-to-police-the-patent-holdup-problem-in-the-standard-setting.pdf>)

One final point about patent remedies concerns standing: it is not just the type of harm that matters to antitrust, but whether anyone has a remedy to address it. Antitrust fills the gap left open by patent law by providing a remedy to those “outsiders”—consumers, competitors and others—who lack standing to seek relief under the patent laws. Consider Qualcomm: The use of equitable estoppel there was only available as a defense asserted by the alleged infringer. The elements of the defense discussed above, moreover, require that the infringer either be involved in the SSO process or have a specific basis for claiming that it was affirmatively misled by the patentee. No consumer injured by the wrongful acquisition of monopoly power in this context would meet these criteria, nor would other firms that have been excluded from the market due to the deception at issue. There is no government enforcement agency to protect such plaintiffs, because patent law has no provision for government enforcement intended to protect consumers from harm to competition.

In sum, the limitations of patent law would exclude many of the categories of potential plaintiffs suffering antitrust injury as a result of standard-setting abuse. We conclude that equitable estoppel is unequal to the task of policing monopolization through fraudulent conduct in the standard-setting process.

#### B---targeting deficit---faulting the entire SSO is key to curtail monopolization---targeting individual SEP holders fails.

Melamed & Shapiro 18, \*A. Douglas Melamed is Professor of the Practice of Law at Stanford Law School; \*Carl Shapiro is the Transamerica Professor of Business Strategy at the Haas School of Business at the University of California at Berkeley; (May 2018, “How Antitrust Law Can Make FRAND Commitments More Effective”, https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/How-Antitrust-Law-Can-Make-FRAND-Commitments-More-Effective.pdf)

Antitrust enforcement aimed only at SEP holders is not sufficient to prevent or remedy ex post opportunism. First, as described in Part I, that kind of enforcement must be implemented separately for each patent holder, and for many standards, there are hundreds or even thousands of SEP holders. Second, some of the most common kinds of opportunism are arguably beyond the reach of antitrust claims against SEP holders. 61 Moreover, enforcement aimed at SEP holders is not directed at the basic problem: the failure of the SSOs to take adequate steps to prevent the ex post opportunism that the SSOs’ conduct enabled.

#### D---litigation deficit---the counterplan limits damages from an infringement suit---that’s NOT sufficient because the threat of litigation alone will cause implementers to cave.

Rubin 17, \*Jonathan Rubin, Partner, Patton Boggs, LLP, Washington, D.C; (May 2017, “PATENTS, ANTITRUST, AND RIVALRY IN STANDARD-  
SETTING”, https://moginrubin.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/RutgersRubinVol382.pdf)

One justification put forward for favoring ex ante RAND commitments is that they should require patent holders to “contract out of an injunction- backed property rule, and into a reasonable-royalty liability rule.”107 In other words, ex ante RAND commitments are supposed to adequately protect standard-adopters because a patentee giving such a commitment presumably relinquishes its right to enjoin the adopters’ practice of the standard.108 The belief apparently is that an assurance that the patentee will, at worst, sue for a high level of royalties by forswearing injunctive relief is sufficient to allow standard-setters to adopt patented technology without fear of ex post hold-up.

At least three criticisms can be leveled against this justification for making the RAND commitment the centerpiece of an SSO’s patent policy. First, it applies only to patents that are known or disclosed ex ante and not to the more fundamental problem in which hold-up occurs because the existence of the patent remained unknown until after the standard had been adopted and implemented. The JEDEC policy, for example, did not prevent the hold-up that occurred in Rambus II.

Second, while a waiver of the injunctive remedy is certainly not meaningless, it is difficult to see how it could mean so much. Clearly, the threat of an injunction can be disruptive and may even put an immediate stop to an alleged infringer’s commercial operations. But, the specter of lengthy and costly litigation, the outcome of which could alter the alleged infringer’s fundamental business proposition, is not a negligible prospect for most businesses.

A third reason to be troubled by reliance solely on a voluntary RAND commitment is that it tends to suppress ex ante discussions or negotiations, particularly when coupled with a prohibition that discussions of licensing terms beyond their general description as RAND is not suitable for discussion within the SSO. There is some evidence that both U.S. antitrust agencies are moving toward recognition of the procompetitive potential of ex ante discussions.109 For reasons discussed below, the expansion of ex ante negotiations is likely to be procompetitive and should not be hampered by the mistaken belief that a simple RAND commitment is sufficient.110

## K — Cap

#### Both advantages impact turn the K---they’re robust defenses of innovation, which the alt can’t solve.

Kornai 13, \*János Kornai is a Hungarian economist and the Allie S. Freed Professor of Economics Emeritus at Harvard and Professor Emeritus at Corvinus University of Budapest; (János, November 6th, 2013, “Dynamism, Rivalry, and the Surplus Economy”, DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199334766.001.0001, Google Books)

C. There is no competition between producers and sellers. Production is strongly concentrated. Many companies enjoy monopolist positions, or at least a (regional) monopoly in producing an entire group of products. The chronic shortage of products creates monopolistic behavior even when many producers operate in parallel. The shortage economy, one of the strongest system-specific properties of socialism, ~~paralyzes~~ impedes the forceful engine of innovation, the incentive to fight for the favors of the customer ( Kornai 1971 ; 1980; 1992, chapters 11 – 12 ). The producer/seller is not compelled to attract the buyer by offering him a new and better product, since the latter is happy to get anything in the shop, even an obsolete and poor-quality product.

There are examples of inventive activities motivated by chronic shortages: ingeniously created substitutes for missing materials or machinery parts (Laki 1984 –1985). These results of the inventors’ creative mind, however, do not become widespread, commercially successful innovations in the Schumpeterian sense. 25 Table 2.1 features only one revolutionary innovation that did not appear first in a capitalist country but, rather, in the Soviet Union: synthetic rubber. Its inventor had been doing research on the subject for decades; the employment of it in industry was rendered necessary by the shortage of natural rubber.

D. The tight limits of experimenting. Capitalism allows for hundreds or thousands of barren or barely fruitful attempts, so that, afterward, one out of the hundreds or thousands would succeed and bring immense success. In the socialist planned economy, actors are inclined to avoid risks. As a result, the application of revolutionarily significant innovations are more or less excluded, since those always mean a leap into the dark, as success is necessarily unpredictable. As far as followers are concerned, some economies follow up quickly, others slowly. The socialist economies belong to the group characterized by the slowest pace. They prefer to maintain the already known, old production procedures, and produce the old well-tried products; new technologies and new products have too many uncertain characteristics making the planning of the directives difficult.

E. There is no capital waiting to be utilized; investment allocation is rigid. Central planning is not miserly with the resources devoted to capital formation. The share of investment carved out from the total output is typically higher than in the capitalist economies. However, this enormous volume is appropriated ahead of time to the last penny. Moreover, most of the time over-allocation takes place; in other words, the ensemble of all project plans prescribes the requisition of more resources than the required amount to execute the plan. It never happens that unallocated capital is waiting for someone with a good idea. The allocators do not search for an entrepreneur waiting to step forward with a proposal for innovation. Flexible capital markets are unknown. Instead, the rigid and bureaucratic regulation of project activities takes place, and to devote capital resources to activities with possibly uncertain outcomes is unconceivable. No foolish minister of industry or factory manager could be found who would demand money for ventures admitting in advance that the money may be wasted and the innovation may not succeed. 26

#### Technological innovation successfully dematerializes growth.

McAfee 19, \*Andrew Paul McAfee, a principal research scientist at MIT, is cofounder and codirector of the MIT Initiative on the Digital Economy at the MIT Sloan School of Management; (2019, “More from Less: The Surprising Story of How We Learned to Prosper Using Fewer Resources and What Happens Next”, https://b-ok.cc/book/5327561/8acdbe)

There is no shortage of examples of dematerialization. I chose the ones in this chapter because they illustrate a set of fundamental principles at the intersection of business, economics, innovation, and our impact on our planet. They are:

We do want more all the time, but not more resources. Alfred Marshall was right, but William Jevons was wrong. Our wants and desires keep growing, evidently without end, and therefore so do our economies. But our use of the earth’s resources does not. We do want more beverage options, but we don’t want to keep using more aluminum in drink cans. We want to communicate and compute and listen to music, but we don’t want an arsenal of gadgets; we’re happy with a single smartphone. As our population increases, we want more food, but we don’t have any desire to consume more fertilizer or use more land for crops.

Jevons was correct at the time he wrote that total British demand for coal was increasing even though steam engines were becoming much more efficient. He was right, in other words, that the price elasticity of demand for coal-supplied power was greater than one in the 1860s. But he was wrong to conclude that this would be permanent. Elasticities of demand can change over time for several reasons, the most fundamental of which is technological change. Coal provides a clear example of this. When fracking made natural gas much cheaper, total demand for coal in the United States went down even though its price decreased.

With the help of innovation and new technologies, economic growth in America and other rich countries—growth in all of the wants and needs that we spend money on—has become decoupled from resource consumption. This is a recent development and a profound one.

Materials cost money that companies locked in competition would rather not spend. The root of Jevons’s mistake is simple and boring: resources cost money. He realized this, of course. What he didn’t sufficiently realize was how strong the incentive is for a company in a contested market to reduce its spending on resources (or anything else) and so eke out a bit more profit. After all, a penny saved is a penny earned.

Monopolists can just pass costs on to their customers, but companies with a lot of competitors can’t. So American farmers who battle with each other (and increasingly with tough rivals in other countries) are eager to cut their spending on land, water, and fertilizer. Beer and soda companies want to minimize their aluminum purchases. Producers of magnets and high-tech gear run away from REE as soon as prices start to spike. In the United States, the 1980 Staggers Act removed government subsidies for freight-hauling railroads, forcing them into competition and cost cutting and making them all the more eager to not have expensive railcars sit idle. Again and again, we see that competition spurs dematerialization.

There are multiple paths to dematerialization. As profit-hungry companies seek to use fewer resources, they can go down four main paths. First, they can simply find ways to use less of a given material. This is what happened as beverage companies and the companies that supply them with cans teamed up to use less aluminum. It’s also the story with American farmers, who keep getting bigger harvests while using less land, water, and fertilizer. Magnet makers found ways to use fewer rare earth metals when it looked as if China might cut off their supply.

Second, it often becomes possible to substitute one resource for another. Total US coal consumption started to decrease after 2007 because fracking made natural gas more attractive to electricity generators. If nuclear power becomes more popular in the United States (a topic we’ll take up in chapter 15), we could use both less coal and less gas and generate our electricity from a small amount of material indeed. A kilogram of uranium-235 fuel contains approximately 2–3 million times as much energy as the same mass of coal or oil. According to one estimate, the total amount of energy that humans consume each year could be supplied by just seven thousand tons of uranium fuel.

Third, companies can use fewer molecules overall by making better use of the materials they already own. Improving CNW’s railcar utilization from 5 percent to 10 percent would mean that the company could cut its stock of these thirty-ton behemoths in half. Companies that own expensive physical assets tend to be fanatics about getting as much use as possible out of them, for clear and compelling financial reasons. For example, the world’s commercial airlines have improved their load factors—essentially the percentage of seats occupied on flights—from 56 percent in 1971 to more than 81 percent in 2018.

Finally, some materials get replaced by nothing at all. When a telephone, camcorder, and tape recorder are separate devices, three total microphones are needed. When they all collapse into a smartphone, only one microphone is necessary. That smartphone also uses no audiotapes, videotapes, compact discs, or camera film. The iPhone and its descendants are among the world champions of dematerialization. They use vastly less metal, plastic, glass, and silicon than did the devices they have replaced and don’t need media such as paper, discs, tape, or film.

If we use more renewable energy, we’ll be replacing coal, gas, oil, and uranium with photons from the sun (solar power) and the movement of air (wind power) and water (hydroelectric power) on the earth. All three of these types of power are also among dematerialization’s champions, since they use up essentially no resources once they’re up and running.

I call these four paths to dematerialization slim, swap, optimize, and evaporate. They’re not mutually exclusive. Companies can and do pursue all four at the same time, and all four are going on all the time in ways both obvious and subtle.

Innovation is hard to foresee. Neither the fracking revolution nor the world-changing impact of the iPhone’s introduction were well understood in advance. Both continued to be underestimated even after they occurred. The iPhone was introduced in June of 2007, with no shortage of fanfare from Apple and Steve Jobs. Yet several months later the cover of Forbes was still asking if anyone could catch Nokia.

Innovation is not steady and predictable like the orbit of the Moon or the accumulation of interest on a certificate of deposit. It’s instead inherently jumpy, uneven, and random. It’s also combinatorial, as Erik Brynjolfsson and I discussed in our book The Second Machine Age. Most new technologies and other innovations, we argued, are combinations or recombinations of preexisting elements.

The iPhone was “just” a cellular telephone plus a bunch of sensors plus a touch screen plus an operating system and population of programs, or apps. All these elements had been around for a while before 2007. It took the vision of Steve Jobs to see what they could become when combined. Fracking was the combination of multiple abilities: to “see” where hydrocarbons were to be found in rock formations deep underground; to pump down pressurized liquid to fracture the rock; to pump up the oil and gas once they were released by the fracturing; and so on. Again, none of these was new. Their effective combination was what changed the world’s energy situation.

Erik and I described the set of innovations and technologies available at any time as building blocks that ingenious people could combine and recombine into useful new configurations. These new configurations then serve as more blocks that later innovators can use. Combinatorial innovation is exciting because it’s unpredictable. It’s not easy to foresee when or where powerful new combinations are going to appear, or who’s going to come up with them. But as the number of both building blocks and innovators increases, we should have confidence that more breakthroughs such as fracking and smartphones are ahead. Innovation is highly decentralized and largely uncoordinated, occurring as the result of interactions among complex and interlocking social, technological, and economic systems. So it’s going to keep surprising us.

As the Second Machine Age progresses, dematerialization accelerates. Erik and I coined the phrase Second Machine Age to draw a contrast with the Industrial Era, which as we’ve seen transformed the planet by allowing us to overcome the limitations of muscle power. Our current time of great progress with all things related to computing is allowing us to overcome the limitations of our mental power and is transformative in a different way: it’s allowing us to reverse the Industrial Era’s bad habit of taking more and more from the earth every year.

#### Their building of counter-institutions opens the door to cooption while tethering their political imagination to recreating the squo in red.

Kalisz, 20 (Teresa, organizer based in New York City and a member of Red Bloom and the Marxist Center, “Everyday Ruptures: Putting Basebuilding on a Revolutionary Path,” *The Left Wind,* <https://theleftwind.wordpress.com/2020/04/24/everyday-ruptures-putting-basebuilding-on-a-revolutionary-path/>)

Because of these contradictions, the prefigurative model seems on the surface more preferable. It recognizes the importance of organizing, and understands that mass unrest doesn’t necessarily translate into organization. The prefigurative model asserts that we must build working class institutions of counterpower and alternative power. Institutions of counterpower are organizations such as revolutionary unions or tenants unions that fight the boss, landlords, or state, or provide protection from them. Institutions of alternative power are organizations which provide alternatives to the state in the form of mutual aid, workers and buyers cooperatives, community clinics, etc. Organizing in the prefigurative model is conducted at a distance from the state, understood as something external to the working class. But this strategy underestimates the state’s ability to co-opt radical projects. These organizations of counter- and alternative power can just as easily be co-opted, as they prove inefficient in competing with the resources of the state and so seek funding grants from liberal funds in order to survive. Or else, the state may integrate them into the social welfare system. We only need to look at the movement history of the 1930s and 1970s, how various radical alternative institutions and grassroots movements became agents of distribution of services for the state. Advocates of the prefigurative model promote the development of our own healthcare clinics as an alternative to medicare for all. But consider the recent example of the Culinary Workers Union in Las Vegas, who used the defense of their medical clinics to support centrist candidates against Bernie Sanders because of his advocacy for a universal healthcare system. While the CWU has long been allied with capitalist politicians, this example does show how our own alternative institutions can be co-opted not just to become agents of welfare distribution for the state, but also as a defense for capitalist austerity. The combination of an opposition to protesting and a focus on developing institutions that act as an alternative to state- or capitalist-provided services can lead to a drift of resources from organizations of counterpower to the alternative institutions. The gradual expansion of the alternative institutions can start increasing in priority as the organizations of counterpower run into the limits of a strategy which doesn’t engage the state and opposes reforms. Since the alternative institutions are already conceived as a replacement for the existing capitalist, this can easily morph into a vision of building a new society in the shell of the old. Rather than a revolution, a new reformism is born that sees a gradual disengagement from capitalism through workers’ associations, cooperatives, and community gardens as means to supplant capitalism regardless of the revolutionary pretenses of the organizations. Beyond just the threat of a new reformism, this strategy will still lead us to a similar problem as in the ‘insurrectionary’ model: there is still a gap between the work that happens right now and the future revolutionary crisis. At what point do our organizations of dual power constitute actual dual power? What even guarantees that the organizations that we build will become the organizations of dual power? Before WW1, the German Social Democrats had an intensive infrastructure of alternative institutions and unions and, when push came to shove, it was not these gymnasiums, pioneer clubs, party schools, or affiliated unions that lead to the German Revolution, it was the networks and new organizations born during the war years and the mutinying sailors which launched and carried out the revolution. The German Social Democrats’ alternative institutions played an important role in building and developing the movement, but they did not constitute the infrastructure of the dual power situation. Rather than elevating a series of organizational or tactical tools to the throne of ‘strategy,’ or surrendering the question of revolution to far off systemic crises, we need to develop an adaptable strategy for revolution that builds on the organizing we are currently engaged in while also providing a bridge to the moment of revolution.

#### The government cracks down on the alt — kills solvency — assumes every possible strategy

Fredrik deBoer 16, Limited-Term Lecturer, Introductory Composition at Purdue Program, 3/15/16, “c’mon, guys,” http://fredrikdeboer.com/2016/03/15/cmon-guys/

I could be wrong about the short-term dangers, and the stakes are incredibly high. But in the end we’re left with the same old question: what tactics will **actually work to secure a better world?** In a sharp, sober piece about the meaning of left-wing political violence in the 1970s, Tim Barker writes “If you can’t acknowledge radical violence, radicals are reduced to mere victims of repression, rather than political actors who made definite tactical choices under given political circumstances.” **The problem**, as Barker goes on to imply, is those tactical choices: in today’s America they will essentially **never break on the side of armed opposition against the state**. The government knows everything about you, I’m sorry to say, your movements and your associations and the books you read and the things you buy and what you’re saying to the people you communicate with. That’s simply on the level of information, before we even get to the state’s incredible capacity to inflict violence. Look, **the world has changed**. The relative military capacity of regular people compared to establishment governments has changed, especially in fully developed, technology-enabled countries like the United States. The Czar had his armies, yes, but the Czar’s armies depended on manpower above and beyond everything else. The fighting was still mostly different groups of people with rifles shooting at each other. If tomorrow you could rally as many people as the Bolsheviks had at their revolutionary peak, you’re still left **in a world of F-15s, drones, and cluster bombs**. And that’s to say nothing of the fact that establishment governments in the developed world can rely on the **numbing agents of capitalist luxuries** and the American dream to damper revolutionary enthusiasm

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even among the many millions who have been marginalized and impoverished. **This just isn’t 1950s Cuba**, guys. **It’s just not**. In a very real way, modern technology effectively lowers the odds of armed political revolution in a country like the United States **to zero**, and so much the worse for us. **This isn’t fatalism**. It doesn’t mean there’s no hope. It means that there is **little alternative to organization**, to changing minds through **committed political action** and using the available nonviolent means to create change: a concert of grassroots organizing, labor tactics, and **partisan politics**. Those things aren’t exactly likely to work, either, but they’re a **hell of a lot more plausible than us dweebs taking the Pentagon**. Bernie Sanders isn’t really a socialist, but he’s a social democrat that moves the conversation to the left, and if people are **dedicated and committed to organizing**, the local, state, and national candidates he inspires will **move it further to the left still**. You got any better suggestions? Listen, commie nerds. My people. I love you guys. I really do. And I want to build a better world. **Not incrementally, either**, but with the kind of **sweeping and transformative change** that is required to fix a world of such deep injustice. But **seriously**: none of us are ever going to take to the barricades. And it’s a good thing, too, because we’d probably find a way to shoot in the wrong direction. I can’t dribble a basketball without falling down. American socialism is largely made up of bookish dreamers. I love those people but they’re not for fighting. And even if you have a particular talent for combat, you’re looking at fighting the combined forces of Google, Goldman Sachs, and the defense industry. Violence is hard. Soldiering is hard. In an era of the NSA and military robots, it’s really, really hard. **“Should we condone revolutionary violence?” is dorm room, pass-the-bong conversation fodder**, of **precisely the moral and intellectual weight** of “should we torture a guy if we know there’s a bomb and we know he knows where it is and we know we can stop it if we do?” It’s built on **absurd hypotheticals**, propped up by the power of anxious machismo, and undertaken to **no practical political end**. It’s understandable. I get it, I really do. But it’s got nothing to do with us. The only way forward is the **grubby, unsexy work of building coalitions** and asking people to climb on board

## DA — FTC Tradeoff

#### FTC is excessively devoting resources to enforcing patent holdup now.

Morris 9/17/21, \*Angela Morris, Deputy editor at IAM Media; (September 17th, 2021, “The FTC creates a potential new US headache for SEP owners”, https://www.iam-media.com/frandseps/the-ftc-creates-potential-new-us-headache-sep-owners)

SEP owners that may already be wary of potential Biden Administration regulatory changes now have a new threat to keep them up at night.

Over the summer the Federal Trade Commission [announced an expanded view](https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-ftc-expands-section-5-enforcement-7020931/) of its standalone enforcement authority to curb anti-competitive misconduct; and [now the agency has made it clear](https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2021/09/ftc-streamlines-investigations-in-eight-enforcement-areas) that priority targets include “abuse of intellectual property” and “monopolistic practices”.

The agency’s description of the “anticompetitive and deceptive conduct” it seeks to curtail in the technology sector most likely will encompass alleged misconduct by standards essential patent (SEP) owners and their commitments to licensing on FRAND terms, according to IP and antitrust attorney Tim Syrett.

“The FTC has previously conducted two investigations where it found that SEP holders seeking injunctions against licensees was anti-competitive and presented a threat to innovation,” Syrett, who is a partner in Wilmer Hale in Washington DC, explains via email. “That may be an area where the FTC wants to continue to devote resources and is certainly an area where there can be harm to competition because of the hold-up power of SEPs.”

He adds that investment-backed patent assertion entities and patent aggregation organisations may also have reason to fear ITC investigations.

“Investment-backed patent assertion entities can obscure information about who actually owns or has an interest in patents that can harm both licensing and litigation,” says Syrett. “Further, we have seen a concerning rise of patent assertions where the incentives of investors to obtain outsized returns from patents trump any reasonable valuation of the patents’ worth, which can harm competition in the licensing of patents.”

IP owners in the pharmaceutical, technology and gasoline refining industries should also take note of the development, since the commission indicated that it would investigate potential abuses of IP rights that create anti-competitive and deceptive conduct in those spaces.

Big Tech companies and other large businesses would be advised to pay attention as well, given that another stated FTC aim is to target alleged abuses of their market power that stop entrepreneurs from competing.

The two resolutions were among a group of eight that a divided commission passed this month on a 3-2 vote, as the agency seeks to handle increased workload from high merger filings. Both resolutions, effective for 10 years, direct the agency to use its compulsory processes to obtain documents and testimony through either demands or subpoenas to investigate allegations that would be a violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act.

#### 1---Plan is key to RtR—otherwise courts rule against the FTC based on *Qualcomm* precedent

Owings and Maule 9/22 (Taylor Owings, partner in Baker Botts' Antitrust and Competition Practice Group; Steve Maule, Associate with Baker Botts. He practices in all areas of intellectual property law, including patent litigation, prosecution, and licensing, 9-22-2021, "The FTC’s Repair Restriction Ambition May Face Friction," IPWatchdog, https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2021/09/22/ftcs-repair-restriction-ambition-may-face-friction/id=137824/)

The FTC Will Need to Heed Patent Protections

Intellectual property rights will provide another check on the FTC’s “right to repair” efforts. It will be acting in the shadow of two high-profile failures to redraw the boundary between antitrust and IP: In 1-800 Contacts, the Second Circuit rejected the FTC’s argument that trademark protections should take a back seat to its competition concerns. In Qualcomm, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the company’s right to exclude competitors from making products with its patented technology, regardless of the static effects on competition in that market. In both cases, the en banc courts rejected the FTC’s requests for rehearing. These admonitions suggest that the FTC will have to be careful not to overreach when drawing new boundaries for repair restrictions.

Commissioner Christine Wilson has expressly warned her fellow commissioners not to let the crusade against repair restrictions overcome the goal of IP rights: to foster innovation by protecting significant investments in research and development. She acknowledges the FTC must look carefully at the protections that patent law provides companies in the context of repairs to patented technology.

If the FTC does indeed look, they will find that U.S. courts have been addressing the scope of the right to repair patented goods for more than 170 years—all the way back to Wilson v. Simpson, 50 U.S. 109 (1850). Although “there is no bright-line test” for determining whether a defendant’s behavior in the repair context is infringing, Sandvik Aktiebolag (Sandvik) v. E.J. Co., 121 F.3d 669, 674 (1997), court precedent distinguishes a “permissible repair” from a “forbidden reconstruction.” See, e.g., Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336 (1961). A trio of cases illustrate this distinction.

Aro Manufacturing Company, Inc. v. Convertible Top Replacement Company, Inc., 365 U.S. 336 (1961)

The Convertible Top Replacement Company acquired rights to U.S. Patent No. 2,569,724, claiming a convertible top for automobiles with a flexible fabric top and supporting structure. While the fabric was often worn after only a few years of use, the rest of the convertible top was typically usable for the lifetime of the automobile. The defendant, Aro Manufacturing, manufactured and sold replacement fabrics, which the patent owner claimed infringed its patent. Specifically, the patent owner argued that replacing the fabric was an infringing reconstruction because the fabric was an “essential” or “distinguishing” element of the patented combination and was expensive and difficult to replace. The Supreme Court rejected those arguments. Instead, it reasoned that the invention claimed was the combination of fabric with supporting structure, meaning the replacement of the fabric alone was a non-infringing repair.

Automobile Body Parts Association v. Ford Global Technologies, 930 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

The Federal Circuit recently addressed the definition of an infringing reconstruction in another case involving automobile parts. In Automotive Body Parts Association, Ford’s design patents protected the design of its F-150 truck vehicle hood and head lamp. U.S. Patent Nos. D489,299 and D501,685. The Association sought a declaratory judgment that Ford’s design patents were invalid or unenforceable and, on appeal, argued that purchasers of Ford’s F-150 trucks are licensed to repair their trucks using replacement parts embodying the patented designs. The Federal Circuit distinguished Aro, where the spent part alone was not patented, while Ford’s design patents specifically covered the vehicle hood and head lamp designs. Thus, the court held that creation of new parts matching those designs was an infringing reconstruction. See also Aiken v. Manchester Print Works, 1 F. Cas. 245 (C.C.D.N.H. 1865).

Sandvik Aktiebolag v. E.J. Company, 121 F.3d 669 (1997)

Whether a defendant’s actions are permissible “repair” or an infringing “reconstruction” may also be determined using the multi-factor test outlined in Sandvik Aktiebolag. The patent owner, Sandvik, manufactured and sold a patented drill, including a drill tip that wore down with use. U.S. Patent Nos. 4,222,690 and 4,381,162. The drill tip could be resharpened several times, but if damaged, the drill was no longer useful without retipping. The patent owner did not manufacture or sell replacement tips, so the defendant, E.J., would retip drills for some customers. Retipping involved a lengthy process, including heating the tip, replacing it with new material, and machining the new material to recreate the unique geometry of the original tip. To determine whether retipping was an infringing reconstruction, the Supreme Court reasoned:

“There are a number of factors to consider in determining whether a defendant has made a new article . . ., including

the nature of the actions by the defendant,

the nature of the device and how it is designed (namely, whether one of the components of the patented combination has a shorter useful life than the whole),

whether a market has developed to manufacture or service the part at issue, and

objective evidence of the intent of the patentee.”

Based on these factors, the Supreme Court concluded the retipping was an infringing reconstruction. One critical observation in the Court’s “totality of the circumstances” review was that the patented drill was unusable once the tip was damaged. In Aro and other cases, some parts of the patented object had a “useful life much longer than that of certain parts which wear out quickly.” The Court also looked to whether there was a market to support replacement parts. In this case, there was “no evidence of a substantial market for drill retipping,” because it was not easily detached or replaced. Finally, the decision noted that the patent owner never intended to have the drill tips replaced based on the drill’s design and the absence of available replacement parts and instructions. In other cases, patent owners had clearly intended for certain parts to be replaceable.

FTC Goals May Take a Back Seat to Innovation

The FTC may face an unavoidable conflict with patent law if it tries to bolster third-party repair services that reconstruct a patented product after it is no longer useful, or if an individual replacement part is itself patented. In those cases, the FTC’s goal of protecting competition in repair markets may have to take a back seat to the dynamic competition that characterizes innovation markets.

#### 27 State RtRs solve—Inserting a map

Proctor 21 (Nathan Proctor, Senior Director, Campaign for the Right to Repair, 3-22-2021, "Half of U.S. states looking to give Americans the Right to Repair," No Publication, <https://uspirg.org/blogs/blog/usp/half-us-states-looking-give-americans-right-repair>)

Map

Description automatically generated

The full list of states and bills, and the equipment covered, is below:

1. Arkansas - SB 461 (ag equipment)
2. California - SB 605 (medical equipment)
3. Connecticut - HB 5255 and HB 5826 (all non-car devices), and HB 6216 (cars)
4. Colorado - HB 1199 (all non-car and non-medical equipment, though includes class 2 wheelchairs)
5. Delaware - HB22 (all non-car devices)
6. Florida - S 374 and H 0511 (ag equipment)
7. Hawaii - SB 760 (medical equipment), SB 564 (all non-car devices), HB415 (consumer products), HB 226 (all non-car devices)
8. Illinois - HB 3061 (all non-car devices)
9. Kansas - HB 2309 (ag equipment)
10. Maryland - SB 412 and HB 84 (all non-car devices)
11. Massachusetts - HD 260 and SD 199 (all non-car and non-medical equipment)
12. Missouri - HB975 (ag equipment), HB 1118 (all non-car devices)
13. Minnesota - HF 1156 (all non-car and non-medical equipment)
14. Montana HB 175 (all non-car and non-medical equipment) and HB 390 and SB 273 (ag equipment)
15. Nebraska - LB543 (ag equipment)
16. Nevada - AB 221 (all non-car devices)
17. New Jersey - A 1482 (all non-car devices) A 2906 (ag equipment)
18. New Hampshire - HB449 (home appliances)
19. New York - S04104 (all non-car and non-medical equipment) S149 (ag equipment)
20. Oklahoma - HB1011 (all non-car devices)
21. Oregon - HB 2698 (all non-car and non-medical equipment)
22. South Carolina - H 3500 (ag equipment)
23. Texas - HB 2541 (medical equipment)
24. Vermont - H.58 and S.67 (ag equipment)
25. Washington - HB 1212 (consumer devices)

UPDATE April 22, 2021.

26. Pennsylvania - HB1152 (all non-car equipment)

27. Rhode Island - HB 6141 (ag equipment)

#### 2---private action---the plan buttresses private enforcement to remedy SSO patent holdup---that zeroes the link.

Speegle 12, \*Adam Speegle, J.D., (May 2012, “Antitrust Rulemaking as a Solution to Abuse on the Standard-Setting Process Setting Process”, <https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1128&context=mlr>)

* Plan is not FTC activism
* Requiring SSO’s to administer rules lets the private sector self-manage
* No new staff/resources required
* No FTC monitoring required
* If the FTC does have to do anything, number of cases will be limited due to deterrence, which solves an excessive workload

This too is not fatal to the approach. The proposed rule uses a light touch in that it only buttresses rules established by SSOs. Because the rule would support actions by the private sector to manage their own activities rather than introducing additional agency oversight, Congress would be unlikely to react the way it did when the FTC's activism in the consumer protection arena evoked fears of excessive government intervention.

One final concern with the approach is that it will demand more of the FTC in a regulatory capacity than the FTC is capable of handling. For example, under any rule where the FTC would be called upon to enforce RAND terms, the FTC might fall into the role of license-rate regulator, determining which licensing fees are reasonable and which are unreasonable. But the FTC is a relatively small institution with limited resources.1 62 Some are concerned that under such a scenario the Commission would have to bring on new staff with expertise in the technology sector to monitor the reasonableness of licensing terms arising from SSO commitments.163

This concern is unlikely to be serious under the proposed formulation. As to the problem of determining "reasonableness," the FTC has already developed expertise in this area and, in fact, recently authored a report putting forth workable solutions to the problem of calculating "reasonableness" in the context of RAND commitments. 64 Further, the FTC would not need to establish itself as a monitoring body and would not incur the related costs of increases in staff and resources. Rather, enforcement of the proposed rule would operate similarly to the FTC's enforcement of its consumer protection rules. Under that regime, companies and individuals report fraudulent activity that violates one of the FTC's rules, which the Commission then investigates and, at its discretion, prosecutes. 16 Because the burden would be on the private sector to report in such a regime, the FTC would not need to monitor SSO activity. And as with consumer protection enforcement, a small number of decisive enforcement actions against abusive firms should act as a deterrent sufficient to decrease the FTC's litigation workload. 166 Thus, despite some legitimate concerns with the approach of enforcement by rule, those concerns are not fatal to the strategy. Moreover, the next Section demonstrates that there are also general benefits to enforcement by rule that weigh in favor of the approach.

#### 3---deterrence---the prospect of antitrust intervention deters violations.

Cheng 13, \*Thomas Cheng, B.A. (Yale), J.D. (Harvard), B.C.L. (Oxon); Attorney & Counsellor, New York State; Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, The University of Hong Kong; (2013, “Putting Innovation Incentives Back in the Patent-Antitrust Interface”, <https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1195&context=njtip>), ability edited

Imposing a duty to license on opportunistic patentees may solve this problem. If these patentees know that the courts may step in and mandate licensing at a reasonable royalty rate,214 they will be induced to enter into negotiations with follow-on innovators in good faith.215 The threat of compulsory licensing may become a default background legal rule against which negotiations between initial and follow-on innovators take place. The instances in which the courts need to intervene could be few.

#### \*Private financing and human capital solve otherwise inevitable agency resource shortages

Bornstein 19, Associate Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law. (Stephanie, “Public-Private Co-Enforcement Litigation”, 104 Minn. L. Rev. 811, pg. 865-869)

C. COLLABORATIVE SOLUTIONS TO ENFORCEMENT DEFICITS

Both public and private halves of current hybrid enforcement schemes now face critical levels of constraint. On the one hand, federal agencies created by Congress to enforce public law statutes are hamstrung by slashed budgets and intense deregulatory political preferences, limiting their capacity to litigate enforcement actions.284 On the other, private attorneys general are limited by jurisprudence on compelled arbitration, pleading standards, and class action certification, reducing their incentives to take on risky litigation that serves a public good and, if a mandatory individual arbitration clause applies, barring them from doing so entirely.285 Given this new normative reality, this Section argues that a proposal of co-equal co-enforcement has much to offer, providing needed resources to public enforcers while helping private enforcers overcome procedural hurdles.

On the public enforcement side, collaboration offers the obvious advantage of providing desperately needed litigation financing to public agencies with limited budgets.286 Private attorneys general fund their cases through attorneys’ fees, contingency fees, and private litigation financing mechanisms, all guided by their estimate of the value of the case rather than a narrow federal budget.287 Combining forces also provides public agencies with additional person-power, and at a high level of expertise when those private attorneys are experienced in litigating complex class actions.288 These observations are not new: legal scholars have long identified similar advantages of the private bar—even those scholars ambivalent about or seeking to reign in entrepreneurial private attorneys general.289 Yet co-enforcement arrangements offer an important advantage over others’ proposals to expand public oversight of private attorneys general.290 A collaborative co-counsel approach recognizes that private attorneys, many of whom have deep expertise and lucrative class action practices, may bristle at the idea of serving as contract attorney “agents” for public agencies that they may perceive as overly bureaucratic—and for whom they are footing the bill. Indeed, despite three decades of academic calls for federal public oversight over private class action attorneys291—and even in the wake of new procedural restrictions on private attorneys292—there is little evidence that deputization schemes have been widely adopted at the federal level.293 As described in Part III, each enforcer in a co-enforcement scheme would be co-equal in authority and would share in the financing of its own efforts,294 likely a more attractive option for the private bar.

On the private enforcement side, collaboration offers the advantage of helping private plaintiffs’ attorneys overcome each of the three areas of procedural litigation reform calcified in Supreme Court jurisprudence in the past decade.295 For areas of public law affected by mandatory arbitration agreements, including employment, consumer, and antitrust claims, private attorneys may no longer be able to litigate at all without joining forces with a public agency that is not bound by individual private agreements to arbitrate.296 Likewise, the upfront costs and risk involved in modern class certification procedures may pose too difficult a hurdle for many plaintiffs’ attorneys to overcome. As described in Part III, this challenge may be overcome by cocounseling with a public agency not required to comply with Rule 23 to bring systemic cases.297 And, while pleading requirements under Rule 8, as recently interpreted in Twombly and Iqbal, would apply equally to complaints filed by public and private attorneys, private attorneys may benefit from the substantial investigatory resources and pre-discovery subpoena power of public agencies, whose access to information at an earlier phase in the case may help ensure surviving a motion to dismiss.298

After decades of litigation reform efforts to address fears about profit-motivations in the private attorney general model,299 there are new concerns that the pendulum has swung too far in the opposite direction, limiting access to the courts for federal statutory claims that rely on private enforcement.300 In an era of strong and well-funded public agencies, such concerns might have been assuaged by a sense that public enforcers could pick up the slack, stepping in where private enforcers are now constrained.301 That, however, is not today’s reality. Strong deregulatory preferences, exacerbated by corporate campaign financing, in the wake of years of litigation reform stand to wreak havoc on public law enforcement. As scholars have documented, public laws enacted by Congress with hybrid enforcement mechanisms rely on the robust participation of private enforcers,302 and public agency budgets are designed with the expectation that the private bar will fill an enforcement gap.303 Each side of a hybrid enforcement scheme is now operating with one hand tied behind its back. From a normative perspective, public-private co-enforcement offers the chance to combine the two remaining hands to ensure one strong, united enforcement presence.

# 1AR

## K — Cap

#### Kallis sucks — Even the people who want degrowth want 3% growth rates

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There is no political constituency currently demanding degrowth, but a survey of 1,008 people in Spain finds that one-third prefers ignoring or stopping growth altogether (64). Even so, the majority, including those in this one-third, want growth rates in the order of 3% or higher (64). This may not be as paradoxical as it first seems: One may be aware that continued growth is impossible or catastrophic but also sense that capitalist societies need growth to avoid collapse. The stability of current economies does depend on growth—growth is necessary to avoid unemployment, reduce debt, and fund public services. Recent economic research, however, shows that this is not necessarily so—under certain conditions, economies may function well without growth. We now turn to this research.

#### Hickel is wrong---cherry-picks data and misinterprets evidence.

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Some gloomsters perversely refuse to acknowledge when a glass is even half empty, especially when doing so cuts against their ideological sensitivities. One ploy is to pour the data into a bigger glass and hope that no one notices. London School of Economics anthropologist Jason Hickel has given us a near-perfect example of this sort of sleight-of-hand in Guardian column headlined "[Bill Gates says poverty is decreasing. He couldn't be more wrong](https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/jan/29/bill-gates-davos-global-poverty-infographic-neoliberal)."

At this month's meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davis, Gates cited data that show the proportion of people living in extreme poverty declining from 94 percent in 1820 to only 10 percent today. "The claim is simple and compelling," asserts Hickel. "And it's completely wrong."

Actually, it's Hickel who gets it entirely wrong.

Gates' alleged offense is to have shown a slide devised by the folks at the invaluable [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/) project. As you can see, it tracks six positive economic and social trends over the past 200 years:

Our World in Data

Hickel mischaracterizes that first chart as a count of "people living in poverty." Then he complains that the cutoff—an income equivalent to $1.90 per person per day—is "obscenely low." But absolutely nobody is claiming that living on $1.90 a day is a picnic. The condition being measured here isn't poverty but extreme poverty, as defined by the World Bank. And that has indeed been [declining steeply](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.DDAY) over the past four decades.

Hickel claims that there are a number of problems with Gates' graph. "First of all, real data on poverty has only been collected since 1981," he argues. "Anything before that is extremely sketchy, and to go back as far as 1820 is meaningless." As we'll see, that's also wrong, but for now let's follow Hickel's lead and look at that more recent period.

So what do the "real data" on poverty tell us? Starting with that $1.90-per-day measurement, the level of extreme poverty fell from 42.2 percent of the world's population in 1981 to [8.6 percent in 2018](https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2018/09/19/decline-of-global-extreme-poverty-continues-but-has-slowed-world-bank). In 1981, 1.9 billion people lived on less than $1.90 per day; in 2018, the number was around 660 million.

Don't like that metric? The World Bank has adopted two additional poverty threshold measures at [$3.20 and $5.50 per day per person](http://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/richer-array-international-poverty-lines). They too are falling:

But Hickel doesn't bother to tell his readers what the global income data say about those trends. Instead he insists on his own threshold of $7.40 per person per day. "We see that the number of people living under this line has increased dramatically since measurements began in 1981, reaching some 4.2 billion people today," he observes.

Charitably interpreted, Hickel has succumbed to [judgment creep](http://science.sciencemag.org/content/360/6396/1465).

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The Harvard psychologist Daniel Gilbert and his colleagues have argued, in a 2018 [study](http://science.sciencemag.org/content/360/6396/1465) published in Science, we are misled about the state of the world because we have a tendency to continually raise our threshold for success as we make progress. "Solving problems causes us to expand our definitions of them," they [explain](https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2018/06/180628151752.htm). "When problems become rare, we count more things as problems. Our studies suggest that when the world gets better, we become harsher critics of it, and this can cause us to mistakenly conclude that it hasn't actually gotten better at all. Progress, it seems, tends to mask itself."

In 1981, 42.2, 57.1, and 66.4 percent of the world's population fell below the $1.90, $3.20, and $5.50 thresholds respectively. By 2015, those ratios had dropped to 10.0, 26.3, and 46.0 percent. Even though the world population increased from 4.5 to 7.3 billion from 1981 to 2015, the absolute number of people living on less than $5.50 a day peaked at around 4 billion in 1999 and fell to 3.4 billion in 2015. If current rising income trends continue, the number of people living on less than $7.40 per day will soon start to drop too. At which point Hickel will again have to shift his goalposts.

And yes, the absolute number of people living under Hickel's threshold has increased. But that's just because the world's population has gone up. The percentage of people in that category has been falling.

Meanwhile, using slightly different data, researchers associated with the [World Data Lab and the Brookings Institution](https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2018/09/27/a-global-tipping-point-half-the-world-is-now-middle-class-or-wealthier/) reported in September 2018 that "just over 50 percent of the world's population, or some 3.8 billion people, live in households with enough discretionary expenditure to be considered 'middle class' or 'rich.' About the same number of people are living in households that are poor or vulnerable to poverty." These researchers broadly define the "middle class" to cover households spending $11 to $110 per day per person, in 2011 purchasing power parity. (Purchasing power parity is when the price of identical goods and services are equal in one country and another country when factoring in the exchange rate.)

World Data Lab

Hickel is also wrong when he claims that trying to calculate extreme poverty rates as far back as 1820 is "meaningless." He asserts that the folks at Our World in Data are inappropriately [citing a 2002 study](http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/files/BourguignonMorrisson2002.pdf) that was focused chiefly on inequality in the distribution of world GDP. But determining inequality ratios requires that you figure out the spread of incomes that people earned. In this case, the researchers used the World Bank's extreme poverty threshold, measured as living on less than $1 per day in 1985 dollars, and reported that it "[fell from 84 percent](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/declining-global-poverty-share-1820-2015) of the world population in 1820 to 24 percent in 1992." Measured as living on less than $2 per day in 1985 dollars, they calculated a 94 percent poverty rate in 1820.

"World economic growth, though strongly inegalitarian, contributed to a steady decline in the headcount measure of poverty throughout the period under analysis," the researchers report. "Over the 172 years considered here, the mean income of world inhabitants increased by a factor of 7.6. The mean income of the bottom 20 percent increased only by a factor of slightly more than 3, that of the bottom 60 percent by about 4, and that of the top decile by almost 10." In other words, as a global average, the rich got richer faster than the poorest folk did, but the circumstances of both improved significantly. The same dynamic is still at work today, and that's what really annoys Hickel.

Why did Hickel feel the need to deny that plain facts about these positive global trends? Largely because he wants to claim even if global poverty as measured by mere monetary income has been declining, that actually implicates pervasive Western oppression. What these data on improving incomes really "reveal is that the world went from a situation where most of humanity had no need of money at all to one where today most of humanity struggles to survive on extremely small amounts of money," he claims. "Prior to colonisation, most people lived in subsistence economies where they enjoyed access to abundant commons—land, water, forests, livestock and robust systems of sharing and reciprocity. They had little if any money, but then they didn't need it in order to live well—so it makes little sense to claim that they were poor."

Not to complicate matters too much, but most people encountered by colonizers lived in hierarchical, largely agricultural societies—empires, kingdoms, etc.—and not in the egalitarian commons of Hickel's imagination. But some groups, such as the aborigines in Australia and the Kung! in Africa, remained more or less pure hunter-gatherers. It's not a good idea to romanticize their lives: A 2013 study aggregating [mortality data for several groups of hunter-gatherers](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/256641936_Infant_and_child_death_in_the_human_environment_of_evolutionary_adaptation) reports an average infant mortality rate (defined as death before the child's first birthday) of 27 percent and a child mortality rate (death before the 15th birthday) of 49 percent. The Our World in Data chart cited by Gates notes that the [global child mortality rate](https://ourworldindata.org/child-mortality) (here defined as death before age 5) declined from 43 percent in 1800 to 4.3 percent now. Similarly, a [2007 review article](http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.737.7899&rep=rep1&type=pdf) of life trajectories of various subsistence society groups found that "on average 57 percent, 64 percent, and 67 percent of children born survive to age 15 years among hunter-gatherers, forager-horticulturalists, and acculturated hunter-gatherers." (The researchers define acculturated hunter-gatherers as groups that have either recently started horticulture and/or have been exposed to medicines, markets, and other modern amenities.)

Hickel does have a grain of a point here: If a society meets a substantial share of people's needs outside the monetary economy, income statistics aren't the best way to measure their well-being. But you can still compare life expectancy in those communities to life expectancy elsewhere. The 2007 review article finds that "among traditional hunter-gatherers, the average life expectancy at birth varies from 21 to 37 years, the proportion surviving to age 45 varies between 26 percent and 43 percent, and life expectancy at age 45 varies from 14 to 24 years." That's essentially the same range as global life expectancy in 1800. In 2016, global average life expectancy [exceeded 72 years](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN). The proportion of hunter-gatherers surviving to age 45 is considerably lower than 55 percent of Englishmen back in 1851. The range of 14 to 24 years of additional life expectancy for hunter-gatherers at age 45 is basically [the same as for Europeans at age 65](https://data.oecd.org/healthstat/life-expectancy-at-65.htm) today.

Nor is life expectency the only statistic at our disposal. That 2007 paper reports that violence (homicide and warfare) accounted for [18.8 percent of the deaths](http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.737.7899&rep=rep1&type=pdf) among the subsistence groups under review. For comparison's sake, interpersonal and collective violence in 2016 [claimed the lives of 560,000 people](http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/U-Reports/SAS-Report-GVD2017.pdf) around the world. Given a world population of 7.7 billion, that's a death by violence rate about 0.007 percent.

Why has Hickel engaged in such statistical subterfuges and Edenic anthropological handwaving? Because he despises "free market capitalism" and wants to issue "a ringing indictment of our global economic system, which is failing the vast majority of humanity." Except, as we've seen, it is not. During the past two centuries, that system has lifted billions out of humanity's natural state of abject poverty, ignorance, and violence, and that process of economic uplift has dramatically accelerated in the past four decades. If the institutions that undergird that growth can be sustained, average incomes will continue to their rapid rise, enabling those around the globe who are still mired in poverty to enjoy ever greater prosperity.

Bottom line: Bill Gates is right that poverty is decreasing, and Hickel couldn't be more wrong.